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Top Income Shares, Business Profits, and Effective Tax Rates in 
Contemporary Chile 
 
Tasha Fairfield and Michel Jorratt 
 
 
Summary 
 
This paper contributes to the burgeoning research on inequality and top incomes around the 
globe by presenting the first available estimates of top income shares and effective income tax 
rates in contemporary Chile based on analysis of anonymous income tax return microdata. We 
pay special attention to business income, which dominates at the top of the distribution. Our 
analysis includes not only distributed profits, but also the large proportion of accrued profits 
retained by firms. Our most conservative estimate of the income share received by the top 1 per 
cent of Chileans, constructed directly from income reported to the tax agency, is 15 per cent for 
2005 and 2009 – the fifth highest share reported in the top incomes literature. When distributed 
profits are adjusted for widespread under-reporting, we estimate that the top 1 per cent share 
increases to roughly 22 per cent. When distributed profits are replaced by accrued profits in our 
definition of income, we obtain 19 per cent as our lowest estimate for the top 1 per cent share. 
Despite this impressive income concentration, the rich in Chile pay modest effective income tax 
rates. The top 1 per cent pay an average effective rate of 16-17 per cent when distributed profits 
are not adjusted for under-reporting, and less than 9 per cent when distributed profits are 
adjusted to national accounts. When we include corporate income tax and accrued profits in our 
analysis (without adjustments), the effective tax burden for the top 1 per cent is 16 per cent.  
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Introduction 
 
Inequality is an increasingly salient issue around the globe for scholars, the development 
community, policymakers, and citizens at large. Many economists have argued that inequality is 
detrimental for development: inequality may both interfere with poverty reduction and hinder 
economic growth.1 A growing literature in political science examines whether inequality 
undermines democratic stability, and to what extent democracy facilitates redistribution. Some 
argue that inequality hinders democratisation,2 or that failure to improve equity and the material 
well-being of the majority cultivates disillusionment with democracy and may foster political 
violence and the rise of semi-authoritarian rulers.3 Others maintain that highly unequal 
democracies may be quite stable, yet material inequality engenders political inequality, allowing 
the super-rich to block public policies like progressive taxation that might erode their fortunes 
even if these policies are in the majority interest.4 Meanwhile, citizens have taken to the streets 
in several instances to voice equity-related demands in the context of the ‘Occupy’ and ‘99%’ 
movements. The Chilean student movement, which captured the world’s attention in 2011, 
brought the issue of inequality to the forefront of public debate by demanding that the 
government increase taxation of Chile’s wealthy economic elites to fund massive investment in 
public education.5   
  
To date, academic research and public debates on inequality, redistribution, and the influence of 
economic elites in Chile and Latin America more broadly6 have been constrained by inadequate 
empirical information on top income shares and effective tax rates paid by the wealthiest 
citizens. Latin America has long been recognised as the region characterised by the world’s 
most extreme levels of inequality. Estimates based on household surveys indicate that the top 
decile’s share of national income ranged from 34 per cent to 45 per cent (CEPAL 2012).7 
Meanwhile, Latin America’s economic elites are undertaxed compared to their counterparts in 
other countries; income tax revenue as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 
region tends to fall well below values predicted by worldwide regressions based on per capita 
GDP (Perry et al. 2006: 95; Jiménez et al. 2010: 26). Tax incidence studies suggest that the 
ratio of taxes paid to income earned for the top income quintiles or deciles are low (Goñi et al. 
2011: 1563). Yet, by and large we lack accurate information on income shares and effective tax 
rates within the ranks of the top decile, which aggregates individuals of disparate means, from 
professionals culturally viewed as members of the ‘middle class’ to extraordinarily wealthy 
entrepreneurs who dominate business ownership. The household surveys employed in most 
income distribution and tax incidence studies fail to capture information about the very rich for 
two main reasons. First, the rich tend to be under-represented in, if not entirely absent from, 
national survey samples because they constitute such a tiny group and because sampling 
                                                        
1 For example, Alesina and Rodrik (1994); Birdsall and Londoño (1997); World Bank (2004); Ferreira and Ravallion (2008). 
Some question this assessment (Forbes 2000; Banerjee and Duflo 2003); however, according to the World Bank (2004: 
1.16): ‘it is probably fair to say that the balance of academic opinion leans toward the view that high levels of inequality in 
incomes or in assets are causally related to lower rates of growth in mean incomes’. 
2 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). 
3 For example, Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni (2009); Karl (2005); World Bank (2004). Indeed, public opinion polls in Latin 
America have found widespread discontent with high levels of inequality (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2009: 42). 
4  Winters (2011). For variants on this theme, see Jacobs and Soss (2010) and Hacker and Pierson (2010).  For an unusual 
case where elites were too weak to influence tax policy, see Fairfield (2011). 
5  See Fairfield and Garay (2013).   
6   On economic elites and tax policy in Latin America, see Fairfield (2010, 2013), Schneider (2012), and Flores-Macías 
(forthcoming).  
7  Excluding Uruguay (30%), a historically more equitable Latin American country, and Venezuela (29%). 
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procedures are not designed to include them. Second, even if top income earners are included 
in survey samples, they are much more likely than average citizens to refuse to participate.8 
 
Atkinson and Piketty (2009, 2010) and their collaborators have demonstrated that income tax 
return data provides far more accurate information than household surveys on top income 
shares and effective tax rates, even where under-reporting is widespread. To date, however, 
only a handful of Latin American countries have been analysed in this literature, given the 
difficulty of obtaining detailed income tax return data in the region. Many countries have refused 
to provide anonymous income tax return data to academic researchers. A few countries make 
some limited information publicly available. Argentina publishes statistics for the tiny minority 
(approximately 3 per cent of adults) who are required to file income tax declarations.9 The 
Chilean tax agency has also recently begun to publish some income tax return data.10 However, 
given the high level of aggregation, as well as top-coding problems that are characteristic of 
published tax agency data, it can provide at best an incomplete characterisation of the fortunes 
of the very rich. To our knowledge, Colombia is the only Latin American country that has 
provided extended panel microdata for analysis of inequality and tax incidence (Alvaredo and 
Londoño Vélez 2013).  
 
This paper aims to contribute to scholarly research and public debates on inequality and 
redistribution, and to help broaden the scope of developing countries analysed in the top 
incomes literature, by presenting top income shares and effective tax rates estimated from 
original new datasets that we compiled with the generous cooperation of Chile’s Servicio de 
Impuestos Internos (SII). Whereas most studies in the top incomes literature rely on tabulated 
tax return data or samples of individual tax returns, we obtained access to the full universe of 
individual Chilean tax returns for 2005 and 2009. Our datasets are extremely fine-grained, 
aggregating by units of only eleven taxpayers. We are therefore able to report income shares 
and effective tax rates for top income fractiles directly, without recourse to fitting techniques. 
Likewise, we are able to characterise the income distribution and effective tax rate curves within 
the top decile directly. By contrast, Chilean tax agency data provided for Agostini et al.’s (2012) 
tax reform simulations aggregated taxpayers into brackets of 7,422 individuals, and the publicly 
available tax agency statistics analysed by López et al. (2013) aggregate taxpayers into only 
eight brackets according to the marginal tax rate schedule; the top bracket contains 13,000 to 
24,000 taxpayers (depending on the year). This paper therefore provides the most accurate 
description of top income shares and tax rates yet available for contemporary Chile, a country of 
special interest in Latin America given its reputation for successful poverty reduction, economic 
growth and political stability, which have nevertheless coexisted with high levels of inequality 
and recent eruptions of popular discontent. Moreover, this paper is only the second of its kind to 
provide microdata-based estimates of income shares and tax burdens in Latin America.11 
Access to tax return data has long been a highly sensitive issue in Chile, given restrictive 
interpretations of confidentiality and privacy laws.  
 
A novel feature of this paper is our analysis of not only business profits that are formally 
distributed to individual taxpayers, but also the very large proportion of profits that are 
perpetually reinvested in Chilean firms. We thus contribute to emerging research on income from 
wealth and capital – whether realised or not (Atkinson 2009b; Atkinson and Piketty 2010; 
                                                        
8  Atkinson et al. (2010: 669); Alvaredo (2007); Székeley and Hilgert (1999); Groves and Couper (1998). 
9 Argentina’s very narrow coverage is partly due to the fact that pure wage earners are not required to file declarations; their 
taxes are automatically withheld by employers. Alvaredo’s (2010) top income share analysis makes use of this tabulated 
data.  
10 López  et al. (2013) present some estimates using this data.  
11  See also Alvaredo and Londoño Vélez (2013). 
  9 
Smeeding and Thompson 2010; Roine and Walderström 2011). Capital income has long been 
recognised as playing a potentially important role in augmenting inequality, but it is rarely 
analysed given data limitations.12 We imputed accrued profits to Chilean taxpayers using 
ownership shares calculated from information that businesses report to the tax agency on profits 
distributed among their shareholders.  
 
Estimating the distribution of retained profits in Chile is critical because the country has a unique 
integrated income tax system that creates strong incentives for business owners to avoid 
formally withdrawing profits. Chile’s corporate tax serves as a withholding (advance payment) 
against personal income taxes that owners are required to pay when they receive distributed 
profits. Corporate taxes already collected at the firm level are credited against the recipient’s 
personal income taxes when dividends are distributed, so that profits are not double-taxed. 
However, distributed profits enter into the personal income tax base, and personal income is 
subject to progressive marginal tax rates up to 40 per cent. Because the corporate tax rate (17 
per cent between 2004 and 2010; currently 20 per cent) is much lower than the top personal 
income tax rate (40 per cent), business owners leave the majority of their profits in the firm. 
According to tax agency figures, on average only one-third of profits are distributed annually 
(Jorratt 2012: 42). In addition, independent professionals commonly incorporate their earnings to 
avoid paying the much higher personal income tax rates. Retained profits and incorporated 
income are not always channelled into productive investments. Owners find both legal and 
illegal ways to consume profits without declaring dividends and hence without paying the 
corresponding individual income tax: for example, luxury vehicles for personal use may be 
registered to the firm (avoidance),13 or distributed profits may simply be omitted from tax 
declarations (evasion). Income tax evasion is estimated at 46 per cent, essentially all of which is 
associated with distributed profits and dividends (Jorratt 2009: 7).14 Ignoring retained profits in 
income distribution studies therefore significantly underestimates the vast material resources at 
the disposal of Chile’s economic elites.  
 
This paper further contributes to the small but growing literature that analyses not only top 
income shares, but also effective tax rates paid by the very rich (Piketty and Saez 2006; Bach et 
al. 2012; Alvaredo and Londoño Vélez 2013). Such analysis can play an important role in 
informing policy debates and grounding scholarly analysis of redistributive politics and the ability 
of the super-rich to defend their material interests (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Winters 2011). 
Moreover, we include corporate tax in our estimates of effective tax rates. The most widely 
referenced incidence study for Chile excludes profits retained by firms from the definition of 
individual income, and ignores the corresponding corporate taxes because they are a credit 
against future personal income tax payments (Engel et al. 1999: 159). However, corporate tax is 
not only an important source of revenue in Chile (43-50 per cent of total income taxes in recent 
years),15 it is in practice the only tax ever paid on corporate profits given widespread personal 
income tax avoidance and evasion (Cantallopts et al. 2007). Corporate taxation in Chile 
therefore can have important implications for both tax capacity and tax equity. Agostini et al. 
(2012) embrace this view as well; they provide evidence that the tax deferral for capital income 
                                                        
12 Among other problems, many forms of capital income are tax-exempt, especially in developing countries, and hence are not 
reported on tax returns. Only a handful of studies have analysed the contribution of capital gains to top income shares. On 
the serious nature of the problem of missing capital income and top income shares, see Atkinson et al. (2010).  
13 Another frequent avoidance mechanism entails using capital gains to withdraw profits. An owner can buy a property, sell it at 
a higher price to a business in which he or she owns shares, and pay no tax on the capital gain. 
14 It is difficult for the tax agency to control under-declaration of this type since most businesses are organised as partnerships 
rather than publicly-traded corporations, and the tax agency therefore cannot obtain information on distributed profits from a 
disinterested third party.  
15 Authors’ calculations using SII, Serie Ingresos Tributarios Consolidados, 2009-2011, Santiago, Chile 
<http://www.sii.cl/aprenda_sobre_impuestos/estudios/estadistribu/ingresos_tributarios_new.htm> 
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(i.e. profits do not enter the individual income tax base until they are distributed) creates 
significant horizontal inequity and reduces the progressivity of the income tax system. However, 
their analysis is limited by lack of access to the business tax forms that we obtained in order to 
estimate ownership shares.16  
 
Our results indicate that the concentration of income and profits in Chile is among the highest 
currently estimated in the top incomes literature, although uncertainty associated with the 
distribution of undeclared distributed profits and the lack of comparable studies analysing 
retained profits prevent us from confidently ranking Chile among the other income inequality 
leaders (the US, Argentina, Colombia and South Africa). When only distributed profits are 
included in the income definition, we conservatively estimate that the top 1 per cent of adults 
receive an income share of 15 per cent, while the top 0.01 per cent receive 1 per cent. These 
shares increase substantially when we adjust distributed profits for under-declaration. 
Depending on the assumptions employed to impute undeclared profits, estimated shares range 
from 22-24 per cent for the top 1 per cent, and 1.6-5.9 per cent for the top 0.01 per cent. When 
the income definition includes accrued profits instead of distributed profits, the top 1 per cent 
shares range from 19 per cent (unadjusted) to 32-33 per cent (adjusted for under-reporting), 
while the top 0.01 per cent shares rise to between 4 per cent (unadjusted) and 6-7 per cent 
(adjusted for under-reporting). Despite this impressive concentration of income, effective income 
tax rates paid by the richest Chileans are quite modest. The top 1 per cent pay an average 
effective rate of 16-17 per cent when distributed profits are not adjusted for under-reporting, and 
less than 9 per cent when distributed profits are adjusted to national accounts. Our estimated 
average effective tax rates including the corporate tax in the numerator and including accrued 
profits in the income denominator are 16 per cent for the top 1 per cent and 17 per cent for the 
top 0.01 per cent. Effective rates for the US that include the corporate tax are 1.5 to 2 times 
higher (Piketty and Saez 2006); to our knowledge, comparable analyses are not available for 
other countries. 
 
 
1 Data and methods 
 
Whereas multiple previous requests had been denied, in May 2011 Chile’s tax agency (SII) 
graciously agreed to provide us with access to confidential, anonymised individual tax return 
records from 2005 and 2009 within the tax agency’s premises. Compiling our datasets required 
detailed knowledge about the tax agency’s information systems and filing forms, and extensive 
work on the tax agency’s computers, as well as a lengthy process for obtaining authorisation for 
the project. The government has subsequently tightened restrictions on accessing tax return 
data.  
 
By Latin American standards, our datasets are remarkably comprehensive in terms of the 
number of individuals they include. Income taxes in Latin America generally exclude the majority 
of the population: given high levels of poverty and inequality, most adults make less than the 
minimum taxable income. In Chile, approximately 82 per cent of individuals earn less than the 
taxable threshold (Agostini et al. 2012). Nevertheless, individuals registered with the SII 
comprised 63 per cent of adults in 2005 and 67 per cent in 2009 (many of whom did not receive 
enough income to owe taxes). Our datasets contain information on all reported income and 
                                                        
16 Agostini et al.’s (2012) analysis of retained profits relies on the Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN) 
household income survey, which almost certainly does not provide accurate information on capital income and business 
ownership for wealthy individuals.  
  11 
taxes paid by these individuals. This section describes the key components of our datasets and 
the methods used to compile them. 
 
1.1  Income and profits 
 
Our datasets record income in eight categories: pensions (aggregated private and public), 
wages, independent work, interest earnings, rent from real estate, taxable capital gains, 
dividends and distributed profits, and accrued net business profits. Information on the first seven 
categories comes directly from forms filed by taxpayers, cross-checked against forms filed by 
withholding or reporting agents whenever possible (for example, employers in the case of wages 
and banks in the case of interest earnings). To reconstruct total, pre-tax wage income, 
deductions for mandatory health insurance payments and contributions to private pension funds 
were added back to the declared taxable amounts.17  
 
The interest income category includes inflation-adjusted earnings from bank accounts and 
deposits in other financial institutions, as well as capital gains from mutual funds and investment 
funds, capital gains classified as habitual (e.g. stocks bought and sold within one year), and 
interest earned on voluntary pension savings (above the minimum contributions required by 
law). Only real interest earnings are taxable in Chile; taxpayers report losses associated with 
interest rates below inflation or negative habitual capital gains up to the point that they cancel 
out gains in this category. However, interest earnings entries in our datasets are occasionally 
negative, because information was included on taxpayers’ inflation-driven losses as reported by 
financial institutions.18 When estimating income shares, we set negative net interest earnings 
entries to zero.19  
 
Non-habitual capital gains are classified under the separate capital gains income category. As 
with interest earnings, reported capital gains are either positive or zero. Like most developing 
countries, Chile taxes only specific types of non-habitual capital gains. Capital gains from selling 
real estate and stocks in publicly-traded corporations are tax-exempt and hence are not reported 
to the tax agency. Capital gains received by businesses, which account for the majority of 
declared capital gains in Chile, were imputed to individual taxpayers following the same 
procedure used to impute retained profits, which is described later in this section.20 Like capital 
gains, most forms of rental income are tax-exempt.21  
 
We exclude untaxed forms of interest, capital gains, and rent from our income definitions for lack 
of adequate distributional information, as is the norm in the top incomes literature.22 Despite the 
difficulties that relying on income definitions dictated by country-specific tax systems creates for 
cross-national comparisons, this approach is largely inevitable for analyses employing tax 
agency data, and the associated problems are generally sidestepped in the literature.  
                                                        
17 These amounts are not explicitly declared in the tax data, but they can be calculated directly from the statutory 
contribution rates (7% of gross salary for health, with a maximum of 4.2 UF, and 12.7% for pensions with a maximum 
of 7.38 UF (one UF equalled 17,975 pesos in 2005 and 20,943 pesos in 2009)). The only source of uncertainty arises 
from the fact that commissions charged by pension funds vary; the percentage cited incorporates the average 
commission.  
18 We have no such information on net negative capital losses, either for those classified as interest or those reported under 
the separate capital gains category.  
19 This procedure likely underestimates taxable interest income, since one taxpayer’s net inflationary losses may negate 
positive interest earned by another taxpayer within the same aggregated row of our dataset.  
20 Imputed capital gains from businesses are aggregated with capital gains received directly by individuals in our datasets.  
21 For example, owners may rent apartments under a specified square footage tax-free.  
22 Atkinson et al. (2010: 672) observe: ‘In all cases, the estimates follow the tax law, rather than a “preferred” definition of 
income’. For example, Piketty and Saez (2006) ignore non-taxed sources of interest income in their analysis of the US, and 
Alvaredo (2010) ignores all interest income in Argentina, which is tax-exempt.  
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Accrued profits – a unique feature of our datasets – were estimated through a multi-stage 
procedure. First, tax returns were used to reconstruct businesses’ profits from the more limited 
definition of taxable profits declared for the fiscal year. Tax return forms provided direct 
information on losses accumulated from previous years, which were added back to declared 
taxable profits to account for Chile’s unlimited loss carry-forward provisions. Allowances for 
accelerated depreciation should also be added back to declared taxable profits; however, tax 
forms do not contain sufficient information to make this correction.23  
 
In the second stage, accrued profits were imputed to individual taxpayers using information filed 
by businesses on the profits distributed to each of their owners during the two years in question 
(2005 and 2009). Ownership shares were calculated as the ratio of profits received by a 
particular owner to the total profits distributed by the firm during the year in question.24 Accrued 
profits were then allocated in proportion to these ownership shares through an iterative 
assignment process. Multiple iterations were necessary to trace interlocking business ownership 
down to the level of individual taxpayers.25 Through this procedure, 40 per cent (37 per cent) of 
the total accrued profits for 2005 (2009) were imputed to Chilean taxpayers, 28 per cent (33 per 
cent) to foreign owners, and 2 per cent (2 per cent) to funds managed by pension and mutual 
administrators. Profits imputed to foreigners are omitted from our dataset; profits accrued to 
pension funds are discussed below.  
 
We lack ownership information for a sizeable number of businesses that did not report any 
distributed profits in either 2005 or 2009. Profits accrued to these firms constituted approximately 
30 per cent (28 per cent) of the total in 2005 (2009). We employ three alternative approaches for 
handling these profits. The first is simply to omit them from our datasets. The second entails 
imputing these profits based on the distribution of the accrued profits for which we do have 
ownership information. The third imputes the residual accrued profits in proportion to the 
distribution of taxpayers’ declared distributed profits. This third approach assumes that all of the 
firms that did not distribute profits belong to individuals who own other businesses that did 
distribute profits. While all of these approaches are somewhat ad hoc, they provide a rough 
estimate of the uncertainty surrounding the distribution of accrued profits. All three approaches 
assume that the information we have fully identifies members of the Chilean business class. It 
should be noted that we impute accrued net losses in the same manner as accrued net profits;26 
as such, our datasets contain rows with large negative entries in this income category.  
 
                                                        
23 For businesses registered under special tax regimes (most importantly, presumed income regimes for mining, which in 
practice include businesses with significant annual sales values), accrued profits were estimated using a different procedure. 
The first step entailed estimating operating cash flows (sales minus purchases and remunerations) from VAT declarations 
and forms filed by employers. The primary difference between accrued profits and cash flow arises from the treatment of 
fixed assets: purchases are deducted to compute cash flows, but only depreciation during the fiscal year is deducted to 
compute profits. A correction factor for this difference was then estimated by examining ratios of profits to cash flows for 
businesses in the general tax regime.  
24 For those firms that distributed profits during only one of the two years for which we obtained data, we assume that 
ownership did not change significantly across the four-year interval and thereby apply the same ownership shares calculated 
from the year in which the business did distribute profits to the year in which it did not. This situation arose only for 
partnerships (sociedades de personas), which change ownership less frequently than corporations.  
25 A small residual remained after nine iterations and was allocated along with profits from businesses for which we lacked 
ownership information as described in the following paragraph.  
26 Many of the businesses that reported net accrued losses still distributed profits, so we were able to calculate ownership 
shares for imputing these losses. In addition, partnerships must report various ‘disallowed expenses’ (gastos rechazados) 
that cannot be deducted in calculating taxable profits; businesses provide information on the distribution of these expenses 
among their owners which can be used to calculate shares in the same manner as with distributed profits.  
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Accrued profits in pension funds, which belong to the contributors (as opposed to owners of the 
businesses that administer the funds),27 were imputed in proportion to taxpayers’ pension and 
wage income.28 This procedure is highly approximate, given that we lack information on 
taxpayers’ accumulated pension contributions that would be needed to calculate ownership 
shares for members of any given pension plan administrator (AFP). However, our procedure 
captures the general idea that this form of capital income accrues to labour rather than business 
owners.29 It bears emphasis that the profits accrued in these funds are small – only 2 per cent of 
total accrued profits, which corresponded to just 0.7 per cent of total pension and work income in 
2005. As such, profits accrued in pension funds do not have a significant effect on top income 
shares.  
 
1.2  Adjusting for undeclared income 
  
In addition to estimating top income shares using declared income in the categories described 
above, which is the norm in the top incomes literature, we also estimate shares after adjusting 
income in three categories to the Chilean Central Bank’s national accounting figures: 
independent work, distributed profits, and accrued profits. This section describes our rationale 
for adjusting these incomes and the procedures we employ to impute undeclared income. 
Appendix 1 provides additional methodological details.  
 
The first two types of income – independent work and distributed profits – are subject to 
significant under-reporting. Most independent professionals opt to declare expenses under a 
simplified presumptive regime, which in practice probably inflates expenses and thereby reduces 
declared income in many cases. Regarding distributed profits, as previously discussed, the tax 
system creates strong incentives for under-declaration and provides many loopholes to access 
retained profits for consumption, and it is difficult for the tax agency to obtain information from 
impartial third parties that would help detect inconsistencies on tax declarations.30 The amount of 
independent work income calculated from national accounts was 1.3 (1.5) times higher than the 
total declared to the tax agency in 2005 (2009). The discrepancy for distributed profits was far 
greater – the national accounts figure was 2.8 (3.2) times greater than the tax agency figure. We 
believe that this very large gap is explained primarily by evasion. The national accounts value, 
which is a residual calculated from changes in assets based on information provided by financial 
institutions, is accepted by Chilean experts as a good approximation of the profits actually 
distributed to households. The other components of household income in the national accounts 
come from reliable sources and should be free of significant measurement error, so the 
accounting discrepancy that would otherwise arise must reflect unreported distributed profits.  
 
Total accrued profits constructed from national accounts surpassed the tax agency total by a 
lesser but still substantial factor of 1.9 (2.2). This discrepancy is likely explained by a 
combination of under-declaration, tax benefits that could not be estimated (especially for asset 
depreciation) which should be added back to declared taxable profits, and the inherent 
difficulties of constructing a matching definition of accrued profits from national accounts, which 
are derived from different data to serve different purposes. Despite the latter issue, we think it 
                                                        
27 Any accrued profits imputed to pension fund administrators from other businesses are the property of the contributors who 
will later draw on these earnings for their pensions.  
28 Independent workers during these years were not required to contribute to pension funds, and their voluntary savings in 
pension funds tended to be small.  
29 We cannot distinguish between profits from pension funds and profits from mutual funds; however, pensions are known to 
dominate mutual funds. We impute the full amount to wage earners and pensioners.  
30 Tax agency access to bank information on checking accounts, which would help detect undeclared business income and 
independent work income, is highly restricted and cannot be used for general auditing operations.  
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best to adjust the imputed accrued profits to national accounts, given the two known sources of 
downward bias that affect our raw estimates.  
 
Independent work. To adjust independent work income in our datasets, we first use Chilean 
household (CASEN) surveys to estimate the portion of the national accounts figure that accrues 
to individuals who did not file tax returns (Appendix 1). We then impute the difference between 
this amount and the tax agency total to taxpayers in proportion to their declared independent 
work income. In other words, we assume that the distribution of undeclared independent work 
income is identical to the distribution of declared independent work income.  
 
Distributed profits. To adjust distributed profits, we impute the full difference between the 
national accounts value and the tax agency value to tax filers. In doing so, we assume that non-
filers do not receive any substantial capital income,31 which we believe is appropriate for Chile 
given the relatively large percentage of adults registered with the tax agency and the evident 
concentration of capital income in tax agency data; household surveys also suggest that capital 
income is extremely concentrated (Cantellopts et al. 2007). We employ two alternative methods 
for imputing undeclared profits. The first method entails allocating the difference between the 
national accounts total and the tax agency total in proportion to taxpayers’ declared distributed 
profits, again assuming that the distribution of undeclared profits does not differ from that of 
declared profits. This approach likely overestimates evasion among taxpayers who declared 
substantial distributed profits and underestimates evasion among taxpayers with large accrued 
profits who declared minimal distributed profits. Our second method makes the alternative 
assumption that evasion is proportional to the difference between taxpayers’ accrued profits and 
the distributed profits that they declare. In other words, we assume that an individual with a large 
value of accrued profits who declared a minimal value of distributed profits has engaged in 
substantial evasion (rather than truthfully reinvesting profits in the firm). This approach alters the 
distribution of distributed profits to reflect the distribution of imputed accrued profits more closely. 
Of course, neither approach is likely to give an accurate depiction of the actual distribution of 
undeclared profits, which is by definition unknown. Together with the unadjusted data, however, 
they serve to delineate the range of uncertainty.  
 
Accrued profits. For accrued profits, we simply assign the difference between national 
accounts and tax agency totals in proportion to the positive net accrued profits in our datasets. 
This procedure is likely to overestimate earnings for taxpayers at the top of the accrued profits 
ranking, since taxpayers with large net accrued losses do not receive any positive adjustment, 
even though they too may have either under-declared gains or over-declared losses.  
 
Other income sources. We make no adjustments to wage income or pensions reported to the 
tax agency. Employers withhold taxes on wages, so it is unlikely that tax agency data suffers 
from under-reporting. It is possible that some individuals with taxable wage incomes are absent 
from the tax agency’s records because they work for employers operating in the informal sector, 
but we think it is reasonable to assume that the informal sector by and large does not include 
individuals who fall within the ranks of the top 10 per cent.32 The amount of wage income 
reported in national accounts for 2005 (2009) exceeded the tax agency figure by 31 per cent (27 
                                                        
31 Alvaredo and Saez (2010) make the same assumption for Spain that ‘non-filers receive a negligible fraction of capital 
income’. 
32 Most of the difference between the tax agency and national accounts wage figures comes from informal labour in the 
agricultural sector and domestic servants, who are not required to file tax returns. Some of the difference between tax 
agency and national accounts figures could arise from avoidance mechanisms whereby a portion of a taxpayer’s salary is 
disguised as payments to a business owned by that taxpayer. If this practice is widespread, our control income, which 
includes the full national accounts value for wage income, would be inflated (assuming that this income is accurately 
reported to the tax agency as business income).  
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per cent); we allocate this amount entirely to the bottom of the income distribution. In the case of 
pensions, tax agency information comes directly from the pension administrators who distribute 
the funds, so this data should not be affected by under-declaration either.  
 
We do not adjust reported capital gains, rent, or interest earnings in our datasets for lack of 
information on the total amounts of income in these categories beyond what is available in tax 
agency records. It should be noted that rental income and capital gains (including habitual 
capital gains classified as interest) may suffer from substantial under-reporting, since the tax 
agency does not receive information on these income sources from parties other than the 
taxpayers themselves. In contrast, the tax agency does receive independent information from 
financial entities on interest earnings from bank accounts and mutual funds, so data on these 
types of income is more accurate.  
 
1.3 Income definitions for analysing top shares 
 
We analyse top income shares using several different income definitions. We begin with a 
definition based on taxable income that corresponds to earnings realised during the year. This 
income, denoted Y1, includes pensions, wages, independent work, taxable interest, and 
distributed profits.33 We exclude capital gains because this income category in our datasets 
includes capital gains received by businesses, which are not necessarily distributed to owners; 
these capital gains dominate those received directly by individuals. 
 
We next construct an income Y2 that substitutes imputed accrued profits for distributed profits. 
The logic is to approximate more closely a Haig-Simons income definition – consumption plus 
changes in net worth – which aims to measure individuals’ potential to consume without 
reducing their wealth during the period in question. This approach is arguably preferable for 
characterising material resources at the top when realised capital income is small compared to 
unrealised capital income (Smeeding and Thompson 2010).34 Our Y2 income definition is 
particularly appropriate for Chile, given the tendency to under-declare or disguise distributed 
profits, as well as the fact that few capital gains are taxed. As Atkinson et al. (2010: 677) 
observe: ‘When realized capital gains are untaxed and hence not observed, it is important to 
assess the effects of attributing retained profits to top income’.  
 
We estimate top shares using a number of related income definitions that either include or 
exclude capital gains, alter the treatment of pensions, apply alternative adjustment procedures, 
or do not adjust independent work or profits to national accounts at all. Our preferred definition 
of income Y2 excludes capital gains (which are primarily received by businesses), because they 
may reflect profits generated in previous years rather than income generated during the year in 
question, and because including imputed capital gains along with accrued profits may result in 
some double-counting. In addition, since we are particularly interested in examining how top 
income shares change when examining accrued profits rather than distributed profits, we prefer 
to leave other components in the income definition unaltered compared to Y1.  
 
                                                        
33 We would like to exclude public pensions, following top incomes studies that focus on market income, but tax agency figures 
mix public and private pension payments, and we do not have enough information to disaggregate the two. However, Chile’s 
pension system was privatised in 1980, and the residual public system accounted for only 35% of pension payments in 2009. 
This figure excludes public pension top-ups that are paid to low income Chileans and financed by tax revenue. Recipients of 
these public-supported pensions do not earn enough to pay income taxes.  
34 Our income Y2 is similar to Smeeding and Thompson’s (2010) ‘More Complete Income’, which includes imputed capital 
income. The authors substitute imputed capital income for reported interest, rents, and dividends to better approximate 
changes in net worth. For Chile, we lack sufficient information on real estate assets to be able to treat this income source 
similarly to retained profits.  
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Core income definitions:  
Y1 = pensions + wages + independent work + taxable net interest + taxable rent + 
distributed profits; declared incomes only  
Y1_NA = Y1 but adjusting independent work and distributed profits to national accounts  
Y2 = pensions + wages + independent work + taxable net interest + taxable rent + imputed 
accrued profits; declared incomes and accrued profits for which ownership 
information exists only  
Y2_ad = Y2 plus declared accrued profits in firms without ownership information imputed 
in proportion to declared distributed profits 
Y2_aa = Y2 plus declared accrued profits in firms without ownership information imputed in 
proportion to the distribution of accrued profits for which we do have ownership 
information 
Y2_NA = Y2_ad but adjusting independent work and accrued profits to national accounts  
Auxiliary definitions: 
Y1_NA_ada = Y1_NA but using the alternative distributed profits adjustment method based 
on the difference between taxpayers’ positive accrued profits and distributed profits 
(calculated using accrued profits distribution from Y2_ad)  
Y1_NA_ada’ = Y1_NA_ada but calculated using the distribution of accrued profits from Y2  
Y2_ad_ap = Y2_ad with imputed accrued profits from pension funds instead of pension 
payments 
Y2_ad_cg = Y2_ad including capital gains. 
 
1.4  Ranking taxpayers 
 
Our work with the tax agency microdata produced three datasets based on different rankings of 
individual taxpayers, RY_a, RY_b, and RY_c, that correspond to distinct income definitions: one 
with unadjusted distributed profits, one with adjusted distributed profits, and one with adjusted 
accrued profits. After ranking individuals according to each income definition, the data was 
aggregated into groups consisting of eleven taxpayers each, following the tax agency’s protocol 
for protecting taxpayer confidentiality.  
 
Our subsequent analysis identified several minor errors affecting rankings. Below, we explain 
the shortcomings in our dataset rankings and assess the extent to which they may introduce 
errors in our income share estimates. We conclude that the effects are likely minimal, given the 
very fine level of aggregation in our datasets.  
 
Our first dataset was constructed by ranking taxpayers according to income RY_a, which is 
similar to income Y1 with the exceptions that interest income was not included, and independent 
work income was adjusted to national accounts. The second dataset ranked taxpayers by 
income RY_b, which is similar to income Y1_NA, except that interest income was again 
excluded. In addition, the adjustment applied for independent work was too high, and distributed 
profits were inflated too much due to an error in the national accounts adjustment factor (2.5 
instead of 1.8 for 2005 and 3.0 instead of 2.2 for 2009). The third dataset employed ranking 
income RY_c, which approximates Y2_NA_ad, with the same problems that interest income was 
omitted and independent work was slightly over-adjusted. Accrued profits in RY_c were also 
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adjusted incorrectly; net losses were amplified by the same factor as net gains, yet companies 
have no incentive to underestimate their losses.  
 
The ranking income definitions described above determine the cohorts of eleven taxpayers 
aggregated in each dataset, and hence we cannot fully correct the ranking errors without 
renewed access to the tax agency microdata. However, we still have complete, correct 
information on the income sources and taxes paid for each given cohort (row) in our datasets, so 
we can re-rank the given cohorts according to the corrected income definitions. By comparing 
the new rank-orders of our aggregated rows with their original rank-orders, we endeavour to 
assess the magnitude of the errors introduced into our top income share estimates when we 
proceed in this manner. Appendix 2 displays the ratio of top income shares produced by the 
original rankings and by the re-rankings, the percentage difference in shares, the percentage of 
rows that moved in or out of each top fractile, and the corresponding amounts of income that 
moved into and out of each fractile upon re-ranking.  
 
In all cases, the changes introduced by re-ranking datasets according to the desired 
corresponding income definition are marginal. The largest changes occur when re-ranking rows 
in the RY_c dataset according to income Y2. In this case, approximately 9 per cent of rows 
moved in or out of the top 1 per cent, producing a difference in income shares of only 0.6 per 
cent. The top 0.0001 per cent is not altered in any of the cases. The top 0.001 per cent is also 
unaffected, with the exception of the 2009 RY_a ~ Y1 re-ranking where one row shifts out of the 
fractile and is replaced by the second highest subsequent row.  
 
Although we cannot know how income shares would change if the data was re-ranked at the 
individual level, these results suggest that the difference would probably be inconsequentially 
small. Moreover, the errors introduced will be much smaller than those in studies that work with 
pre-tabulated tax agency data. 
 
In the remainder of the paper, we report top shares and effective tax rates for each income 
definition, calculated after re-ranking the rows in the most closely correlated dataset according to 
that income definition. The corresponding datasets employed for our primary income definitions 
are displayed in Table 1.1.  
 
Table 1.1  Dataset rankings and corresponding incomes 
 
RY_a RY_b RY_c 
Y1 Y1_NA Y1_NA_ada 
all Y2 incomes 
   
1.5  Control incomes  
 
We estimate control incomes (i.e. the denominator for calculating top income shares) by 
combining tax agency data with national accounts information, as is standard in the top incomes 
literature when sizeable portions of the adult population do not file tax returns. We construct total 
amounts of wage income, independent work, distributed profits, and accrued profits from 
national accounts. To these amounts we add total tax agency figures for taxable rent and 
interest, for which comparable figures could not be constructed from national accounts. This 
procedure produces control incomes corresponding to Y1_NA (adjusted distributed profits and 
other realised income) of approximately 60 per cent of GDP, the same value used for Argentina 
(Alvaredo 2010). This value is also similar to control incomes for other countries analysed in the 
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Atkinson and Piketty (2009, 2010) top incomes volumes.35 When we replace distributed profits 
with imputed accrued profits (Y2_NA), our control income increases to 70-72 per cent of GDP. 
 
For the income definitions that use profits declared to the tax agency without adjustments (Y1, 
Y2, Y2_ad, Y2_aa), we use the total value of declared profits from the tax agency datasets in 
the control income instead of the national accounts figures, in accordance with our assumption 
that capital income accrues only to tax filers.36 These control incomes are substantially smaller 
(which is not surprising given the large discrepancy between capital income reported to the tax 
agency and capital income calculated from national accounts): 50-51 per cent of GDP for Y1, 
54-55 per cent of GDP for Y2, and 57-59 per cent of GDP for Y2_ad (aa).  
 
Table 1.2 displays the control incomes corresponding to the core and auxiliary income 
definitions we examine. The amounts change very little across the two years. 
 
 Table 1.2  Control incomes, % GDP  
 
 2005 2009 
Y1 50.7 50.0 
Y1_NA 59.3 60.2 
Y2 53.3 52.3 
Y2_ad, aa 58.4 57.0 
Y2_cg 58.5 57.2 
Y2_ap 54.2 53.0 
Y2_NA 70.0 71.7 
 
1.6  Control populations 
 
Income taxes in Chile are filed individually. There is no option for married couples to file jointly, 
and they receive no preferential tax treatment. For the control population, we therefore use 
estimates of the adult population over age 20, following the usual approach in the top incomes 
literature.37 
 
Table 1.3  Population and tax returns 
 
 Population over 20 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadisticos 
Tax returns 
Source: SII 
2005 10,750,033 6,808,535 
2009 11,582,966 7,731,605 
  
 
2  Top income shares and compositions 
 
We begin our analysis of top income shares by discussing results calculated including 
distributed profits (Y1 incomes, Table 2.1a). Top shares are significantly smaller when 
distributed profits are not adjusted to national accounts (Y1) compared to scenarios that do 
adjust profits (Y1_NA and Y1_NA_ada). For the top 1 per cent, for example, we estimate an 
                                                        
35 As Leigh (2009: 157) observes: ‘there do not appear to be systematic differences between nations. On average, the personal 
income control total is about two-thirds of GDP’.  
36 We likewise exclude from the control income the amount of independent work income that we estimate is evaded by tax 
filers. Including this amount lowers top share estimates only slightly.  
37 Studies of Argentina, Canada, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and the US in Atkinson and Piketty (2009, 2010) also use the adult 
population over 20. A few studies use a cut-off age of 15, but to our knowledge very few Chileans under 20 file tax returns. 
Atkinson et al. (2010: 669) maintain that the chosen age cut-off makes little difference to top income shares.  
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unadjusted share of 15.5 per cent, whereas adjusted shares range from 21.7-23.0 per cent. We 
view the unadjusted shares as lower limits, given the problem of under-declared distributed 
profits. The adjusted shares we present are of course educated guesses given that the actual 
distribution of undeclared profits is unobservable. However, we believe that the general upward 
effect on top income shares is accurate. Note also that for the top 1 per cent, estimated adjusted 
shares do not vary much across the alternative methods used to impute undeclared profits.  
 
Table 2.1b and Figure 2.1 place Chile’s top income shares in a cross-national context. When 
examining this data, it is important to remember that definitions of income depend on tax 
systems and therefore vary in potentially non-trivial ways; methodological differences in how 
control incomes are calculated across countries may affect results as well.38 At present these 
difficulties remain unresolved in the top incomes literature. Bearing these caveats in mind, we 
present some tentative comparative conclusions.  
 
When profits are not adjusted to national accounts, Chile’s top 1 per cent shares are similar to 
Singapore and the UK – higher than most European countries, but lower than the four inequality 
leaders in the World Top Incomes Database: Colombia, Argentina, the US, and South Africa 
(Figure 2.1a). However, we believe it is more appropriate to use Chile’s adjusted top income 
shares in cross-national comparisons. Although adjusting top incomes to national accounts is 
not standard in the top incomes literature, Chile’s tax system creates strong incentives for under-
declaring distributed profits that are unique to our knowledge.39 When profits are adjusted to 
national accounts, Chile’s top 1 per cent share surpasses that calculated for any other country in 
the World Top Incomes Database. Evasion-adjusted top 1 per cent shares for Argentina in 2003 
and 2004 (Alvaredo 2007) reach similarly high levels.40  
 
Shares with adjusted profits for Chile’s top 0.1 per cent and higher fractiles are more sensitive 
than top 1 per cent shares to the method used for imputing undeclared dividends. Adjusted top 
0.01 per cent Y1_NA_ada shares are similar to adjusted Argentine shares and higher than all 
other countries that have been analysed using tax return data (Figure 2.1b). Chile’s adjusted 
Y1_NA shares are substantially lower but similar to South Africa. Unadjusted Chilean shares are 
closer to those in European countries.  
 
Our estimated income shares for the top 10 per cent, 1 per cent and 0.1 per cent do not vary 
significantly from 2005 to 2009. Shares at the very top show more percentage variation. For the 
top 0.0001 per cent, Y1 (unadjusted) and Y1_NA shares are about half as large in 2009, a 
recessionary year, whereas Y1_NA_ada shares (distributed profits adjusted to the gap with 
accrued profits) are roughly two times larger in 2009.  
 
Figure 2.2 shows the Lorenz curves (cumulative income distribution) for the top 10 per cent and 
top 1 per cent in 2005, plotted directly from our datasets. For the top 1 per cent Y1_NA_ada 
curve, note the break in the line at the top right corner. The gap between the highest two points 
illustrates the remarkably disproportionate share in this adjusted scenario received by the top 
0.0001 per cent of Chilean adults.  
                                                        
38 For more on these issues, see Atkinson et al. (2010). Appendix 4 displays shares within shares, following Atkinson (2009a), 
which are independent of the estimated control income.  
39 Similar incentives do not exist in Argentina or Colombia, where the top personal income tax rate matches the corporate tax 
rate and dividends do not enter the personal income tax base. In Argentina, tax agency officials have observed that, if 
anything, individual taxpayers have incentives to over-declare capital income in order to justify changes in patrimony that 
might otherwise alert officials to investigate for potential evasion or money laundering (AFIP 2008, interview).  
40 Alvaredo’s methodology for adjusting incomes differs from ours. He views the adjusted Argentine shares as upper limits that 
likely overestimate evasion among the very rich.  
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Table 2.1  Income shares with distributed profits only 
 
a) Chile 2005 (2009) 
  
 Top 0.0001% Top 0.001% Top 0.01% Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 10% 
Y1  0.090 (0.049) 0.332 (0.256) 1.082 (0.973) 3.998 (3.781) 15.47 (14.88) 49.24 (48.78) 
Y1_NA  0.211 (0.106) 0.627 (0.449) 1.812 (1.627) 6.121 (5.884) 21.69 (21.56) 55.40 (55.79) 
Y1_NA_ada  0.645 (1.136) 1.598 (2.166) 3.702 (4.209) 8.590 (9.106) 22.28 (22.74) 55.01 (55.52) 
Y1_NA_ada’ 1.017 (1.751) 2.380 (3.279) 5.271 (5.937) 10.68 (11.31) 23.02 (23.66) 55.04 (55.56) 
 
b) Cross-national comparisons, c. 2005 (2009) 
  
 Top 0.001% Top 0.01% Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 10% 
Argentina adjusted, 20041 NA 3.77 10.29 22.10 NA 
Argentina, 20042 NA 2.49 7.02 16.75 NA 
Colombia, 20033 0.5 (0.9) 1.6 (2.4) 6.0 (7.1) 19.9 (20.2) NA 
United States, 20054 NA 3.29 (3.06) 7.76 (7.52) 17.68 (17.45) 44.94 (46.35) 
 
1 Alvaredo (2007)   
2 Alvaredo (2010)     
3 Alvaredo and Londoño Vélez (2013)     
4 Piketty and Saez (2006)    
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Figure 2.1  Income shares (%), excluding capital gains 
 
a) Top 1%  
 
 
 
b) Top 0.01%   
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, Alvaredo et al. World Top Incomes Database, Alvaredo (2007) 
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Figure 2.2  Lorenz curves, 2005 
Y1 (green), Y1_NA (red), Y1_NA_ada (blue) 
 
a) Top 10% 
   
 
 
 
b) Top 1% 
 
 
 
Top income shares based on accrued profits (Table 2.2) are significantly larger than shares 
including only distributed profits, indicating the very high concentration of capital ownership in 
Chile. These findings agree with other studies that report more significant inequality when 
working with income definitions that include broader sources of realised and/or unrealised 
capital income (Smeeding and Thompson 2010; Atkinson and Piketty 2010; Roine and 
Waldenström 2011). Interestingly, unadjusted shares with accrued profits are close to 
Y1_NA_ada shares with adjusted distributed profits. This similarity arises from the fact that the 
alternative dividends adjustment procedure produces a distribution of distributed profits that is 
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similar to the distribution of declared accrued profits. Figure 2.3 displays the 2005 Lorenz curves 
for Y2_ad and Y2_NA. As with Y1_NA_ada (Figure 2.2), the top 1 per cent Y2_NA curve shows 
a break at the top, indicating the very high income share accruing to the top 0.0001 per cent.  
 
Cross-national comparisons are complicated by the fact that the distribution of retained profits 
has rarely been analysed in other countries.41 However, we can tentatively compare Chile’s 
income shares with accrued profits to income shares including capital gains in other countries, 
assuming for these other countries as Piketty and Saez (2006: 9) do for the US that ‘realized 
capital gains on corporate stock reported on individual tax returns are of comparable magnitude 
to retained earnings from corporations estimated in National Accounts’. Chile’s top 1 per cent 
shares with accrued profits in all but one of the scenarios exceed those for the US; top 0.01 per 
cent shares are comparable or slightly higher than those for the US (Figure 2.4). Chile’s top 
fractile shares in all scenarios exceed those in the handful of additional countries for which top 
income studies have included capital gains.  
 
Table 2.2  Income shares 
 
a) Chile, 2005 (2009), with accrued profits 
 
Chile Top 0.0001% Top 0.001% Top 0.01% Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 10% 
Y2 0.756 (1.222) 1.771 (2.292) 3.958 (4.199) 8.229 (8.282) 19.34 (19.23) 52.60 (52.46) 
Y2_ad 0.719 (1.129) 1.773 (2.152) 4.078 (4.185) 9.322 (9.103) 23.52 (22.82) 56.29 (55.85) 
Y2_aa 1.125 (1.817) 2.639 (3.398) 5.802 (6.132) 11.66 (11.64) 24.52 (24.09) 56.46 (56.08) 
Y2_ad_ap 0.775 (1.215) 1.911 (2.315) 4.394 (4.501) 10.04 (9.785) 25.24 (24.43) 58.84 (58.51) 
Y2_ad_cg 0.749 (1.156) 1.803 (2.304) 4.143 (4.422) 9.430 (9.380) 23.63 (23.07) 56.35 (55.99) 
Y2_NA  1.100 (1.880) 2.701 (3.571) 6.143 (6.833) 13.67 (14.31) 31.66 (32.32) 62.76 (63.65) 
Y2_NA_cg  1.168 (1.513) 2.833 (3.687) 6.437 (7.012) 14.30 (14.51) 32.99 (32.50) 65.30 (63.75) 
 
b) Cross-national comparisons, 2005 (2009), with capital gains 
 
 Top 0.0001% Top 0.001% Top 0.01% Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 10% 
United States NA NA 5.13 (3.89) 10.98 (8.3) 21.92 (18.12) 48.33 (46.5) 
Germany NA NA 2.25  4.81 11.76  37.01 
Japan NA NA 1.36 (1.06) 3.6 (3.15) 11.04 (10.42) 42.43 (41.31) 
Spain  NA NA 1.59 (1.19) 4.11 (3.18) 10.86 (9.27) 34.7 (32.97) 
Sweden  NA NA 1.26 (1.2) 3.33 (2.9) 8.99 (8.41) 29.77 (30.03) 
 
Source: Alvaredo et al. World Top Incomes Database 
 
 
  
                                                        
41 Atkinson (2009b: 99-100) analyses how retained profits affect top income shares in the UK during the inter-war period, 
drawing on limited data available on personally-owned shares.  
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Figure 2.3: Lorenz curves, including retained profits, 2005 
Y2_ad (blue), Y2_NA (purple) 
a) Top 10%       b) Top 1% 
 
 
 
 
c) Top 1%: Y2_NA 
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Figure 2.4  Shares (%), including retained profits (Chile) or capital gains 
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Table 2.3 compares Chile’s income shares with distributed vs. accrued profits. Here we calculate 
shares with accrued profits using two different rankings: one that includes only distributed profits, 
and one that includes accrued profits instead. The goal is to assess how much retained profits 
augment income shares for those who already declare high levels of realised income, and to 
ascertain how much top shares are affected by re-ranking taxpayers based on their accrued 
profits rather than their distributed profits.42 These rankings in fact may be quite different for the 
top percentiles. While distributed profits are correlated with accrued profits, there are taxpayers 
who declare relatively low distributed profits even though their accrued profits are quite large. On 
the other hand, there are cases in which business owners receive distributed profits even though 
the net profits they accrued were actually negative. The mismatch between distributed and 
accrued profits in these latter cases may occur for several reasons. First, businesses may 
distribute profits accrued during a previous year even if they registered losses in the current 
year. Second, an individual may hold ownership in multiple businesses, some of which distribute 
profits but some of which accrue large losses that overwhelm profits accrued in the other firms. 
Third, some of the mismatch between distributed and accrued profits may be an artifact of our 
imperfect reconstruction of accrued profits from taxable profits, due to the difficulties of 
estimating tax allowances for depreciation.  
 
Ranking by dividends (Y1) produces smaller top shares of income including accrued profits (Y2) 
than ranking by Y2, particularly for the top two fractiles (Table 2.3). This result indicates that the 
two rankings do produce significantly different sets of top taxpayers. Ratios of top 1 per cent 
shares with accrued profits to those with distributed profits range from 1.46–1.53, a similar factor 
to ratios of top 1 per cent shares with capital gains to those without in Sweden (Roine and 
Waldenström 2011).  
 
Table 2.3  Income shares with distributed vs. accrued profits by different rankings 
2005 (2009) 
 
 Top 0.0001% Top 0.001% Top 0.01% Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 10% 
Y1 0.090 (0.049) 0.332 (0.256) 1.082 (0.973) 3.998 (3.781) 15.47 (14.88) 49.24 (48.78) 
Y2_ad ranked by Y1 0.187 (0.091) 0.941 (0.394) 2.340 (1.642) 6.681 (5.395) 20.93 (18.90) 54.02 (52.97) 
Y2_ad  0.719 (1.129) 1.773 (2.152) 4.078 (4.185) 9.322 (9.103) 23.52 (22.82) 56.29 (55.85) 
Ratio Y2_ad to Y1  7.99 (23.0) 5.34  (8.41) 3.77  (4.30) 2.33  (2.41) 1.52  (1.53) 1.14  (1.15) 
 
 
 Top 0.0001%  Top 0.001% Top 0.01% Top 0.1% Top 1% Top 10% 
Y1_NA  0.211 (0.106) 0.627 (0.449) 1.812 (1.627) 6.121 (5.884) 21.69 (21.56) 55.40 (55.79) 
Y2_NA ranked by Y1_NA 0.351 (0.203) 1.509 (0.883) 3.845 (2.929) 10.66 (9.344) 29.45 (28.69) 60.47 (60.32) 
Y2_NA 1.100 (1.880) 2.701 (3.571) 6.143 (6.833) 13.67 (14.31)  31.66 (32.32) 62.76 (63.65) 
Ratio Y2_NA to Y1_NA 5.21  (17.7) 4.31  (7.95) 3.39  (4.20) 2.23  (2.43) 1.46  (1.50) 1.13  (1.14) 
 
 
We turn now to the composition of top incomes in Chile. Figure 2.5 shows the share of each 
income type for the top percentiles (Appendix 3 tabulates the data). For income definitions 
Y1_NA, Y2_ad, and Y2_NA, business income dominates other income sources for Chileans 
within the top 1 per cent. The minimum business income was 44 per cent, for the case of top 1-
0.5 per cent Y2_ad earners (unadjusted accrued profits) in 2009. The top 0.1 per cent and 
higher fractiles receive over 80 per cent of all income from business profits, whether distributed 
or accrued. For comparison, the charts with accrued profits (Y2_ad and Y2_NA) also display 
declared distributed profits and capital gains as a percentage of total Y2 income, even though 
                                                        
42 Roine and Waldenström (2011) use a similar approach to assess the importance of capital gains at the top of the income 
distribution in Sweden.  
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neither distributed profits nor capital gains are included in the income definition. Likewise, the 
chart with unadjusted distributed profits (Y1) also displays the ratio of declared distributed profits 
to unadjusted accrued profits. These percentages are all generally low (16-39 per cent), 
indicating that declared distributed profits are not a good measure of business income accruing 
to the wealthiest Chileans.  
 
Incomes with unadjusted distributed profits (Y1) show two distinct features from the other 
scenarios. First, business income makes up a much smaller share of total declared income. 
Distributed profits dominate work income only for the top 0.001 per cent and higher in 2005, and 
in 2009 they reach a maximum contribution of only 33 per cent. Second, the composition of top 
incomes is more variable across the two years. Declared distributed profits make up a much 
lower share of the two top percentile incomes in 2009 (34 per cent and 32 per cent respectively) 
compared to 2005 (72 per cent and 48 per cent respectively). This fluctuation may reflect a 
combination of reduced profits distributed by big businesses in 2009 and greater evasion in the 
recessionary context. In contrast, the composition of unadjusted top incomes with accrued 
profits (Y2_ad) does not vary much across the two years. Accrued profits make up a consistently 
high percentage (over 98 per cent) of the top two percentiles. The large variability of income 
compositions in the unadjusted Y1 data likely indicates the importance of taking undeclared 
distributed profits into account. The total amounts of income (whether adjusted or not) from each 
of the different sources as a percentage of GDP do not vary much across the two years, making 
the large variation in the weight of business income at the top of the unadjusted distribution 
more questionable.  
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      Figure 2.5  Top income compositions (2005 (left bar) and 2009 (right bar))  
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   c) Y2_ad 
 
 
 
 
    d) Y2_NA  
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3 Effective tax rates 
 
While Chile’s individual income tax imposes comparatively high top marginal rates, effective tax 
rates – understood as taxes paid divided by total income earned – are of course much lower, 
because the progressive tax rates apply only to income exceeding the corresponding thresholds 
displayed in Table 3.1. After describing our tax data, we present estimated effective individual 
income tax rates, ignoring retained profits and the corresponding corporate tax paid by 
companies. We then incorporate the corporate tax on retained profits into our analysis.  
 
Table 3.1: Chile’s individual income tax rate structure, 2005 (2009) 
 
Threshold (UTA)* Marginal rate (%) Percentage of taxpayers Percentile of adult population 
0-13.5 0 84.1 (81.7)  
13.5-30 5 10.5 (12.0) Top 10.4 (12.5) 
30-50 10 2.9 (3.3) Top 3.56 (4.30) 
50-70 15 1.2 (1.4) Top 1.64 (2.06) 
70-90 25 0.6 (0.7) Top 0.87 (1.13) 
90-120 32 0.4 (0.5) Top 0.49 (0.64) 
120-150 37 0.2 (0.2) Top 0.23 (0.29) 
150 and above 40 0.2 (0.2) Top 0.13 (0.16) 
 
* Chile’s tax system is fully inflation-adjusted. One UTA equalled 378,842 pesos (USD 674) in 2005 and 442,356 pesos  
  (USD 804) in 2009 
 
Source: SII and authors’ calculations  
 
Our datasets contain information on the amounts of both individual and corporate income taxes 
collected by the tax agency. Chile’s individual income tax is divided into two categories. People 
who earn only wage income pay the ‘second category tax’ (impuesto de segunda catagoría 
(ISC)) with progressive marginal rates rising from 5 per cent to 40 per cent.44 People who 
receive any other sources of income instead of or in addition to wages pay the ‘complementary 
global tax’ (impuesto global complementario (IGC)), which applies the same progressive rate 
schedule to the sum total of taxable income.45 The 17 per cent corporate income tax on accrued 
profits (impuesto de primera categoría (IPC)) was imputed to individuals using the same iterative 
assignment procedure that we employed to allocate accrued profits (Section 1.1). We imputed 
the comparatively small amount of corporate tax corresponding to accrued profits in pension 
funds (approximately 5 per cent of the total) in proportion to taxpayers’ work and pension 
income,46 a similar procedure to that employed by Piketty and Saez (2006) for the US.  
  
Amounts registered for the corporate tax and the IGC and may be negative, indicating that the 
tax agency has reimbursed the taxpayer. Loss carry-back is the most common scenario leading 
to negative corporate taxes. In general, the total annual amount of IGC paid tends to be 
negative, primarily because the credit for the 17 per cent corporate tax paid by companies when 
profits accrue tends to exceed the income tax that individuals owe on their distributed profits. 
However, at the very top of the income distribution IGC amounts are primarily positive.  
  
                                                        
44 All marginal rates except for the top rate were lowered in 2012; the present rates (corresponding to the same thresholds) are 
4%, 8%, 13.5%, 23%, 30.4%, 35.5%, and 40%.  
45 Capital gains are an exception: this income pays the corporate tax rate but does not enter into the IGC base and hence 
receives a preferential tax treatment compared to other income sources.  
46 We estimated the amount of corporate tax from pension funds by applying an effective tax rate (16.8%) calculated from 
aggregate figures to accrued profits in these funds. We do not take independent work into account when imputing corporate 
tax from pensions funds since the bulk of pension contributions were made by dependent workers. The 2008 pension reform, 
however, made pension contributions mandatory for independent workers from 2015.  
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Table 3.2 displays effective tax rates ignoring corporate taxes paid on accrued profits that are 
retained and excluding retained profits from the income definition, as is most common in 
incidence studies. However, we do include corporate taxes corresponding to distributed profits – 
that is, the portion of income taxes owed on distributed profits that was collected from the 
company when profits accrued rather than from the individual recipient when those profits were 
distributed. (Recall that Chile’s corporate tax is credited against individual income taxes owed 
when profits are distributed.) This part of the corporate tax was imputed to individuals by 
applying an effective tax rate from aggregate figures to declared distributed profits; as such, it 
should be stressed that these amounts are rough approximations.47   
 
Estimated effective tax rates are of course much higher when distributed profits are not adjusted 
to national accounts (scenario Y1) than when profits are adjusted to national accounts 
(scenarios Y1_NA and Y1_NA_ada). In the unadjusted scenario, the top 0.001 per cent paid 32 
per cent (33 per cent) in 2005 (2009), while according to scenario Y1_NA, rates were less than 
half as high: 13 per cent (12 per cent). When declared profits are adjusted in proportion to the 
gap between positive accrued profits and declared distributed profits (Y1_NA_ada), average 
effective tax rates are particularly low. In this scenario, the top 0.001 per cent paid only 3 per 
cent in 2005 and merely 0.8 per cent in 2009. This result is explained by the different ranking of 
taxpayers which tends to place at the top individuals with large accrued profits but fewer 
declared distributed profits, and hence comparatively low personal income taxes paid.  
 
Effective tax rates are fairly stable over time for the top 0.001 per cent and lower: the variation 
tends to be roughly within a percentage point. Rates for the richest 0.0001 per cent vary more 
substantially. The effective tax rate using unadjusted profits is 10 points higher in 2009 than in 
2005, while the rate for scenario Y1_NA is two points higher in 2009 compared to 2005. In 
contrast, the top fractile rate in scenario Y1_NA_ada is lower in 2009 than in 2005 (0.3 per cent 
vs. 1.9 per cent). Tax legislation did not change over this period, so the temporal variation likely 
reflects the changing fortunes of Chilean firms and associated re-ranking of taxpayers.  
 
Table 3.2: Average effective tax rates (%) (excluding corporate tax on retained profits)  
 
Income 
denominator 
Y1  
(unadjusted) 
Y1_NA  
(adjusted 
dividends) 
Y1_NA_ada (alternative 
dividend adjustment) 
Colombia1 US2 
 
Germany3 
2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2009 2006 2009 2004 2005 
Top 0.0001% 28.82 38.12 9.52 11.96 1.87 0.29 NA NA NA 28.7 
Top 0.001% 32.14 33.26 12.59 12.33 3.00 0.84 7.3 4.8 NA 31.0 
Top 0.01% 31.81 30.51 13.17 11.81 4.41 2.95 8.3 7.1 25.6 32.9 
Top 0.1% 26.82 26.55 11.65 10.39 7.09 5.98 8.7 7.7 24.8 33.7 
Top 1% 16.12 17.17 8.98 8.55 8.55 8.33 7.5 7.1 20.8 30.5 
P 99.99-100% 31.81 30.51 13.17 11.81 4.41 2.95 8.3 7.1 26.2  
P 99.9-99.99% 24.96 25.18 11.01 9.85 9.12 8.58 NA NA 25.1  
P 99.5-99.9% 15.17 16.66 8.05 7.66 9.88 10.17 7.7 7.6 23.8  
P 99-99.5% 9.05 10.83 7.76 8.14 8.89 9.53 5.6 5.7 21.4  
1 Alvaredo and Londoño Vélez (2013). Individual income tax including corporate tax on dividends 
2 Piketty and Saez (2006), individual income tax only. Taxpayers ranked excluding capital gains 
3 Bach et al. (2012) 
 
It should be noted that effective tax rates vary substantially within the fractiles and percentiles 
reported in Table 3.2 for both of the adjusted profits scenarios (Appendix 6). Most of the spread 
in rates for taxpayers with similar incomes likely arises from imputing undeclared distributed 
profits, which substantially lowers effective rates for taxpayers with capital income. The spread 
                                                        
47 The exact amounts will be obtained pending renewed access to tax agency data.     
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of rates when profits are not adjusted to national accounts is much smaller; horizontal inequities 
in this case arise primarily from personal income tax benefits designed to promote savings.49  
  
The average effective tax rates in Table 3.2 are not strictly progressive. With the exception of the 
2009 unadjusted profits scenario, the richest 0.0001 per cent tend to pay lower rates than the 
top 0.001 per cent. In the alternative dividend adjustment scenario (Y1_NA_ada), average 
effective rates are strictly decreasing above the 99-99.5 percentile. Regressive effective tax 
rates in this case arise from the fact that taxpayers ranked at the top of the Y1_NA_ada 
distribution have large accrued profits and large differences between their accrued and declared 
distributed profits. These taxpayers accordingly receive a large upwards adjustment of 
distributed profits, and these imputed undeclared distributed profits augment the income 
denominator and hence lower the effective tax rates.  
 
Table 3.2 includes effective individual income tax rates for the US (Piketty and Saez 2006), 
Germany (Bach et al. 2012), and Colombia (Alvaredo and Londoño Vélez 2013), the only 
countries to our knowledge for which similar studies have been conducted. These comparisons 
illustrate that tax regressivity at the very top of the income distribution is not a feature exclusive 
to Chile. The Colombian and German rates display similar features. As Alvaredo and Londoño 
Vélez (2013) note, this occurrence is not uncommon in other OECD countries. Regressive tax 
benefits and exemptions that erode the income tax base in Chile (Jorratt 2009) and other 
countries contribute to the low top effective income tax rates, as does preferential tax treatment 
for capital income.  
 
Chilean effective tax rates calculated with declared distributed profits only are similar to or even 
higher than rates in Germany and the US. However, when profits are adjusted for under-
declaration, the resulting Chilean rates are less than half those in the US. The average effective 
tax rate for Chile’s top 0.01 per cent reaches a maximum across the two different adjusted 
dividends scenarios of only 13 per cent in 2005, whereas the top 0.01 per cent paid 26 per cent 
in the US and 33 per cent in Germany.  
 
Our estimates of Chilean effective tax rates with adjusted profits are more similar to Colombian 
rates. Rates in scenario Y1_NA are higher than the Colombian rates, while rates in scenario 
Y1_NA_ada are lower. For example, the top 0.01 per cent in Chile paid 12-13 per cent in the 
first scenario but only 3-4 per cent in the second scenario, while the top 0.01 per cent in 
Colombia paid 7-8 per cent. Two caveats should be kept in mind when comparing the Chilean 
and Colombian rates. First, Alvaredo and Londoño Vélez (2013) do not adjust incomes to 
national accounts. Doing so would likely reduce the Colombian rates. However, given that the 
Chilean tax system creates much stronger incentives than the Colombian tax system to under-
declare profits, we believe that comparing the unadjusted Colombian tax rates to adjusted 
Chilean tax rates is more appropriate than considering unadjusted Chilean rates. Second, the 
Colombian rates are sensitive to Alvaredo and Londoño Vélez’s (2013: 22) assumption that 33 
per cent of income reported under the tax agency’s category of ‘ingresos no constitutivos de 
renta’ (tax-exempt income) are dividends taxed at the firm level.50 They estimate that if dividends 
instead comprise 75 per cent of income in this category, the average effective tax rate for the top 
0.01 per cent would rise from 8 per cent to 14 per cent, which exceeds our maximum estimated 
rate for Chile of 12 per cent (scenario Y1_NA). Given these caveats, as well as the uncertainty 
                                                        
49 Part of the spread likely arises from our imperfect data on interest income; losses were set to zero only after aggregating 
taxpayers into groups of eleven.  
50 The authors do not explain this assumption. Dividends in Colombia, as in Argentina and many other countries, are taxed only 
at the firm level.  
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regarding the actual distribution of undeclared profits in Chile, it is difficult to ascertain whether 
effective tax rates are actually higher or lower than in Colombia.  
 
Table 3.3 displays the shares of total income tax revenue (excluding corporate tax on retained 
profits) collected from the top fractiles and percentiles. These figures are less sensitive to the 
income definitions and adjustment procedures employed; differences arise primarily from the 
distinct rankings of taxpayers. Shares for the top 0.001 per cent and 0.01 per cent are similar in 
Chile and Germany: 2.8 per cent in Germany and 1.7–3.1 per cent in Chile for 2005. However, 
the share collected from the top 0.0001 per cent in Germany (1.2 per cent) is significantly higher 
than in Chile (0.4–0.7 per cent), while the share collected from the top 1 per cent is significantly 
larger in Chile (65.6–73.4 per cent) than in Germany (26.8 per cent), given the greater 
concentration of income and the higher income tax threshold in Chile.  
 
Table 3.3: Shares of total income tax revenue collected from top fractiles 
(excluding corporate tax on retained profits)  
 
Income 
denominator 
Y1 Y1_NA Y1_NA_ada  Germany1 
2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 
Top 0.0001% 0.77 0.49 0.69 0.48 0.42 0.10 1.2 
Top 0.001% 3.14 2.24 2.72 1.99 1.65 0.58 2.8 
Top 0.01% 10.13 7.83 8.21 7.15 5.62 3.94 6.0 
Top 0.1% 31.55 26.47 24.54 21.28 20.96 17.27 12.5 
Top 1% 73.39 67.37 67.04 57.86 65.56 60.09 26.8 
P 99.99-100 10.13 7.83 8.21 7.15 5.62 3.94  
P 99.9-99.99% 21.42 18.64 16.33 14.13 15.34 13.34  
P 99.5-99.9% 27.96 26.32 25.11 21.31 27.06 25.49  
P 99-99.5% 13.88 14.58 17.38 15.27 17.54 17.33  
1 Bach et al (2012) 
 
Table 3.4 displays average effective tax rates defined as all taxes paid during the year divided 
by all income accrued during the year (i.e. using income Y2 in the denominator, which 
substitutes accrued profits for distributed profits). Average effective rates at the top are under 19 
per cent.  
 
Table 3.4: Effective tax rates (%), including corporate tax on retained profits 
 
Income denominator Y2_ad USA1 
Ranked by  2005  2009 2004 
Top bracket 18.18 14.48 NA 
Top 0.001% 16.34 15.54 NA 
Top 0.01% 16.91 16.67 31.2  
Top 0.1% 17.83 17.58 29.2 
Top 1% 15.58 16.06 24.3 
P 99.99-100% 16.91 16.67 30.8 
P 99.9-99.99% 18.68 18.51 30.0 
P 99.5-99.9% 15.96 16.79 28.1 
P 99-99.5% 11.33 12.52 25.1 
* Effective tax rates are essentially unchanged when imputed accrued pensions are substituted for pension payments received 
1 Piketty and Saez (2006), including both individual income tax and corporate tax. The denominator used to calculate effective rates 
includes only realized income. 
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Table 3.5: Shares of total income tax revenue collected from top fractiles, 
including corporate tax on retained profits 
 
Income denominator Y2 
 2005 2009 
Top 0.0001% 3.22 3.87 
Top 0.001% 6.78 7.79 
Top 0.01% 15.69 15.30 
Top 0.1% 34.38 31.83 
Top 1% 70.62 67.50 
P 99.99-100% 15.69 15.30 
P 99.9-99.99% 18.68 16.53 
P 99.5-99.9% 15.96 22.49 
P 99-99.5% 11.33 13.19 
 
The average tax rates reported for the top fractiles and percentiles again mask significant 
variation of rates within these groups. This variation is due largely to the fact that total income 
tax liabilities (individual plus corporate) for the year do not correspond directly to income 
definition Y2 (profits accrued during the year in question, which may or may not be distributed); 
the individual income tax reflects distributed profits, while the corporate tax reflects accrued 
profits. As such, taxpayers with large distributed profits but few accrued profits (or significant 
losses) have very high effective tax rates calculated with income denominator Y2. Even when 
obvious outliers of these types are eliminated, variation of rates among taxpayers with similar 
incomes remains high. In addition to the distinct tax treatment of retained versus distributed 
profits, loss carry-forward or carry-back and use of other tax benefits contribute to the apparent 
horizontal inequities in these effective tax rates.  
 
For comparative context, Table 3.4 also displays average effective tax rates for the US 
calculated by Piketty and Saez (2006), the only study of which we are aware that fully includes 
corporate tax in analysing top fractile tax incidence.52 The Chilean rates are roughly one half to 
two thirds of the US rates. When comparing the Chilean and US effective tax rates, however, it 
should be kept in mind that Piketty and Saez’s (2006) corporate tax incidence assumptions and 
imputation methods differ from ours. They impute corporate taxes paid in proportion to 
individuals’ realised capital income, including dividends, capital gains, and interest; whereas we 
impute corporate taxes paid in proportion to ownership of accrued profits, which we judge more 
appropriate for Chile.53 It should also be noted that Piketty and Saez (2006) do not impute 
reinvested corporate profits in their analysis, since they maintain that realised capital gains on 
stocks in the US are of comparable magnitude. The Chilean context is very different, given that 
few companies are publicly traded, only 35 per cent of profits are distributed annually according 
to tax return data, and total reported capital gains are less than 2 per cent of reported accrued 
profits.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
To restate this study’s main findings, income is very concentrated in Chile, particularly when 
retained profits are incorporated into the analysis. Our results indicate that top income shares in 
                                                        
52 Bach et al. (2012) include a local business tax for Germany, but they do not appear to impute national corporate taxes on 
undistributed profits.  
53 We treat the portion of corporate tax corresponding to pension and insurance funds in a similar manner as Piketty and Saez 
(2006), imputing this amount in proportion to taxpayers’ wage and pension income.  
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Chile – whether profits are adjusted to national accounts or not – are among the highest of those 
countries that have so far been analysed with similar methods. Meanwhile, effective tax rates 
paid by citizens at the top of the income distribution are very low by OECD standards when 
declared incomes are adjusted to national accounts, and comparable to Colombia’s remarkably 
low effective tax rates - though higher in some scenarios. Effective rates in Chile that include 
imputed corporate income taxes reach only two thirds of US rates.  
 
We hope to extend our research on inequality and taxation in Chile during the coming year. Our 
ultimate goal is to build panel datasets, extending forward and backward from the two years for 
which we currently have data. Another key objective is to obtain more complete information on 
business ownership so that we can more accurately impute retained accrued profits.  
 
Beyond this Chilean research agenda, our analysis highlights the need for more research in 
three areas. First, more efforts to analyse the distribution of capital income – whether realised or 
not – could make a significant contribution to our understanding of inequality around the globe, 
although data constraints will likely remain problematic. As the Chilean case illustrates, realised 
capital income may correlate only roughly with unrealised capital income at the top of the 
distribution. Second, more analysis of how tax systems affect income definitions across 
countries (or over time) is in order; the literature is beginning to engage with these questions 
more extensively. In the Chilean case, the structure of income tax creates a particular set of 
incentives that must be taken into account in order to estimate income shares and effective tax 
rates that are more or less comparable with other countries. Additional attention to income 
comparability issues and ways to arrive at greater cross-national systemisation will become 
increasingly important as top incomes are analysed in more developing countries. Third, the top 
incomes literature could fruitfully expand to include more analyses of effective tax rates paid by 
the rich and super-rich. We are aware of only a handful of studies that engage in such analysis. 
This line of inquiry could help to shed light on the relationship between taxation and inequality 
within the top of the income distribution, and could serve as a valuable input for policy debates 
on tax reform.  
 
To that end, we hope that this study and future extensions of this project will inform tax reform 
initiatives in Chile. The evidence presented in this paper supports the view that there is 
substantial room to increase taxes on the rich in Chile. Such initiatives could contribute to 
reducing inequality, both by raising more revenue to finance social spending, and by helping to 
curtail the growth of top incomes – a point that has been made in the broader top incomes 
literature (Saez 2004; Atkinson et al. 2010).  
 
Finally, we reiterate our thanks to Chile’s Servicio de Impuestos Internos, and hope that tax 
agencies across Latin America will adopt policies of greater openness to allowing academics to 
access anonymous tax return microdata. The potential benefits for policymaking and for 
strengthening tax administration and state capacity more broadly in developing countries should 
not be underestimated. As Chaudhry (1997) noted in her renowned study of oil-dependent 
nations, analysing tax records can play a critical role in keeping the state informed about society 
and its economic activities, which is critical not only for tax policy formulation and effective tax 
administration, but also for economic policymaking much more broadly.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1 Adjusting for undeclared income 
 
Independent work 
 
To adjust independent work income in our datasets, we first use Chilean household surveys 
(CASEN) to estimate the portion of the national accounts figure that accrues to individuals who 
did not file tax returns. We assume that non-filers did not earn enough to owe income taxes. 
While some non-filers may be tax evaders, we believe it is highly unlikely that the tax agency 
lacks records on any independent workers who belong to the ranks of Chile’s top income 
earners. The amount of independent work income calculated from CASEN that corresponds to 
the same number of individuals who file tax returns exceeds the tax agency figure. We impute 
the difference to taxpayers in proportion to their declared independent work income. 
  
For this procedure, we rank the household survey data by independent work income. If we rank 
the survey data by total income instead and match to tax-filers on that basis, the adjustment 
amount changes only marginally.  
 
Distributed profits 
 
a) Imputing undeclared profits in proportion to declared distributed profits 
 
This procedure does not alter the distribution of declared distributed profits. When using this 
approach, we would ideally first subtract from the declared values those profits distributed 
directly to individual taxpayers by publicly-traded corporations. These dividends are not subject 
to under-declaration, because the tax agency checks amounts reported by shareholders against 
records provided by these corporations, which are disinterested third parties (unlike closed 
companies). However, the vast majority (at least 90 per cent) of shareholders in publicly-traded 
companies are businesses, not individuals. The potential for bias in our adjustment procedure 
associated with inflating dividends from publicly-traded corporations that were not under-
declared is thereby minimal. (Moreover, we lack information to distinguish dividends paid by 
publicly-traded companies from profits distributed by other firms.) The owners of privately-held 
businesses that receive dividends from publicly-traded corporations may in turn access those 
dividends without declaring distributed profits to the tax agency. In fact, the low prevalence of 
direct individual ownership in publicly-traded companies likely reflects the avoidance and 
evasion incentives created by the income tax system. 
 
b) Imputing in proportion to the difference between accrued and declared distributed profits 
 
This approach entails allocating undeclared distributed profits estimated from national accounts 
to taxpayers in our unadjusted datasets who have positive differences between their accrued 
profits and their distributed profits. The assumption here is that taxpayers with large accrued 
profits who declare very few distributed profits are engaged in evasion. This approach captures 
the inherent incentives that the tax system creates for under-declaring dividends, yet it of course 
fails to distinguish taxpayers who actually do reinvest their profits in the firm from those who do 
so only on paper.  
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Taxpayers with net losses (instead of positive accrued profits) receive no imputed undeclared 
distributed profits. Likewise, taxpayers whose declared distributed profits exceed their accrued 
profits receive no imputed distributed profits. Among the population of taxpayers with positive 
accrued profits whose declared distributed profits are of a smaller value, we allocate undeclared 
distributed profits in proportion to the distribution of total net positive differences between 
accrued and distributed profits in the unadjusted datasets:  
 
Adjustment for taxpayer_i = (PD_NA – PD_SII) * max[0, (P+A_i – PD_i)] / (P+A – PD)  
 
Where:  
P+A = positive unadjusted accrued profits  
PD = unadjusted distributed profits (positive by definition) 
PD_NA = total value of distributed profits from national accounts  
PD_SII = total value of distributed profits declared to the tax agency (SII) 
 
In contrast to adjustment method (a), method (b) alters the distribution of distributed profits 
substantially. Because the value of imputed undeclared profits is so large, the adjusted 
distribution is very close to the distribution of positive accrued profits.  
  
Accrued profits 
 
The national accounts figure was obtained starting from the gross operating surplus, subtracting 
fixed capital consumption (depreciation), subtracting imputed home-owner rent and mixed 
income, adding net interest, royalties, and rent payments, and finally subtracting the state-
owned copper company’s operating surplus. For 2009, due to changes in national accounts 
formatting, we must also subtract mixed income (independent work and sole proprietorship). To 
this figure, we add back sole proprietorship income from tax agency figures; this amount cannot 
be distinguished from independent work in the national accounts figures. 
 
We attribute the full difference between the national accounts and tax agency figures to 
domestic businesses only. The rationale is that mining companies account for the majority of 
foreign-owned profits (roughly 95 per cent), and national accounts figures obtain data on this 
sector’s profits directly from these companies’ public balance sheets. Any evasion that these 
foreign companies engage in is therefore not captured in the national accounts figure. Applying 
this adjustment procedure yields accrued domestic profits of 23 per cent GDP for 2005 and 24 
per cent GDP for 2009. 
 
We impute the difference between the national accounts and tax agency figures only to 
taxpayers in our unadjusted database with net positive accrued profits. Taxpayers with net 
losses receive no adjustment, for lack of any information that could be used to discern a 
reasonable distribution. As usual, we then assume that the distribution of the accrued profits we 
must impute from national accounts follows the distribution of the positive accrued profits in our 
unadjusted datasets. 
 
As noted in the article text, this procedure likely overestimates accrued profits at the top of the 
distribution. Pending renewed access to tax agency files, we plan to assess an alternative 
approach that entails using information on the distribution of businesses’ gross earnings as the 
basis for the adjustment. This option has the advantage that accrued net losses will receive a 
positive adjustment along with accrued net profits. This positive adjustment for net losses is 
desirable given that our estimates of accrued profits do not correct for tax benefits associated 
with depreciation, which may account for some of the large negative values in our datasets.  
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Appendix 2 Assessing the effects of ranking shifts on income shares 
 
RY_a Dataset: Re-ranking by Y1  
2005 (2009) 
 
 Income share ratio:  
re-ranked rows/original 
ranking  
% difference in 
income shares 
% fractile income 
moved in  
% fractile  
income moved 
out  
% rows moved 
in/ out of fractile 
Top 0.001% 1 (1.004) 0 (0.36) 0 (5.68) 0 (5.32) 0 (9.09) 
Top 0.01% 1.000 (1.000) 0.049 (0.04) 1.72 (1.15) 1.67 (1.11) 3.06 (1.91) 
Top 0.1% 1.000 (1.001) 0.040 (0.09) 1.31 (2.12) 1.27 (2.03) 2.25 (3.61) 
Top 1% 1.001 (1.001) 0.057 (0.09) 1.35 (1.90) 1.29 (1.81) 2.26 (3.10) 
Top 10% 1.000 (1.001) 0.003 (0.07) 0.01 (0.91) 0.01 (0.84) 0.03 (2.10) 
 
RY_b Dataset: Re-ranking by Y1_NA 
2005 (2009) 
 
 Income share ratio:  
re-ranked rows/original 
ranking  
% difference in 
income shares 
% fractile 
income moved 
in  
% fractile 
income moved 
out  
% rows moved 
in/ out of fractile 
Top 0.001% 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Top 0.01% 1.000 (1.000) 0.028 (0.00) 0.53 (1.06) 0.51 (1.04) 1.02 (1.90) 
Top 0.1% 1.000 (1.000) 0.042 (0.03) 1.46 (1.00) 1.42 (0.97) 2.56 (1.71) 
Top 1% 1.000 (1.000) 0.040 (0.05) 0.94 (0.95) 0.90 (0.91) 1.87 (1.84) 
Top 10% 1.000 (1.000) 0.018 (0.02) 0.30 (0.28) 0.30 (0.27) 1.00 (0.83) 
 
RY_c Dataset: Re-ranking by Y1_NA_ada 
2005 (2009) 
 
 Income share ratio:  
re-ranked rows/original 
ranking  
% difference in 
income shares 
% fractile 
income moved 
in  
% fractile 
income moved 
out  
% rows moved 
in/ out of fractile 
Top 0.001% 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Top 0.01% 1.000 (1.000) 0.038 (0.024) 0.72 (0.60) 0.68 (0.58) 2.04 (1.90) 
Top 0.1% 1.001 (1.001) 0.135 (0.121) 1.82 (1.13) 1.69 (1.01) 4.50 (2.85) 
Top 1% 1.003 (1.002) 0.266 (0.220) 2.34 (1.75) 2.08 (1.52) 5.03 (3.68) 
Top 10% 1.002 (1.003) 0.218 (0.026) 0.83 (0.70) 0.62 (0.44) 1.92 (1.36) 
 
RY_c Dataset: Re-ranking by Y2  
2005 (2009) 
 
 Income share ratio:  
re-ranked rows/original 
ranking  
% difference in 
income shares 
% fractile 
income moved 
in  
% fractile 
income moved 
out  
% rows moved 
in/ out of fractile 
Top 0.001% 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Top 0.01% 1.001 (1.001) 0.050 (0.095) 1.02 (1.31) 1.08 (1.42) 3.06 (4.76) 
Top 0.1% 1.003 (1.002) 0.293 (0.210) 2.10 (1.69) 2.38 (1.90) 6.55 (5.32) 
Top 1% 1.006 (1.005) 0.635 (0.536)  3.58 (3.89) 4.20 (4.44) 8.99 (9.55) 
Top 10% 1.001 (1.001) 0.078 (0.088) 0.90 (0.98) 0.97 (1.02) 2.65 (2.71) 
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RY_c Dataset: Re-ranking by Y2_ad  
2005 (2009) 
 
 Income share ratio:  
re-ranked rows/original 
ranking  
% difference in 
income shares 
% fractile 
income moved 
in  
% fractile 
income moved 
out  
% rows moved 
in/ out of fractile 
Top 0.001% 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Top 0.01% 1.000 (1.000) 0.000 (0.025) 1.10 (0.61) 1.08 (0.58) 3.06 (1.90) 
Top 0.1% 1.001 (1.001) 0.065 (0.056) 1.46 (1.11) 1.40 (1.06) 3.79 (3.80) 
Top 1% 1.002 (1.001) 0.172 (0.090) 1.88 (1.87) 1.74 (1.75) 4.38 (4.28) 
Top 10% 1.000 (1.000) 0.038 (0.049) 0.65 (0.73) 0.61 (0.68) 1.95 (2.11) 
 
 
RY_c Dataset: Re-ranking by Y2_aa  
2005 (2009) 
 
 Income share ratio:  
re-ranked rows/original 
ranking  
% difference in 
income shares 
% fractile 
income moved 
in  
% fractile 
income moved 
out  
% rows moved 
in/ out of fractile 
Top 0.001% 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Top 0.01% 1.000 (1.001) 0.039 (0.076) 1.01 (1.03) 1.05 (1.11) 3.06 (3.81) 
Top 0.1% 1.001 (1.001) 0.121 (0.096) 1.46 (1.11) 1.59 (1.20) 4.71 (3.61) 
Top 1% 1.002 (1.003) 0.249 (0.255) 2.24 (2.34) 2.51 (2.58) 6.19 (6.32) 
Top 10% 1.000 (1.001) 0.048 (0.062) 0.66 (0.73) 0.71 (0.79) 2.15 (2.29) 
 
 
RY_c Dataset: Re-ranking by Y2_NA 
2005 (2009) 
 
 Income share ratio:  
re-ranked rows/original 
ranking  
% difference in 
income shares 
% fractile 
income moved 
in  
% fractile 
income moved 
out  
% rows moved 
in/ out of fractile  
Top 0.001% 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Top 0.01% 1.000 (1.000) 0.016 (0.015) 0.36 (0.55) 0.35 (0.55) 1.02 (1.91) 
Top 0.1% 1.000 (1.000) 0.000 (0.035) 0.22 (0.75) 0.22 (0.72) 0.61 (2.18) 
Top 1% 1.000 (1.000) 0.032 (0.031) 0.38 (0.87) 0.37 (0.81) 1.09 (2.51) 
Top 10% 1.000 (1.000) 0.007 (0.020) 0.22 (0.40) 0.21 (0.38) 0.83 (1.49) 
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Appendix 3 Composition of top incomes, 2005 (2009) 
 
Income Sources, % Y1  
 
 Wages and 
pensions 
Independent 
work 
Interest Rent  Distributed 
profits 
Ratio of 
unadjusted 
distributed 
profits to accrued 
profits 
Top 0.0001% 1.31 (20.73) 26.32 (40.17) 0.07 (5.270) 0.03 (0.00) 72.27 (33.83) 34.25 (23.21) 
Top 0.001% 20.27 (41.41) 22.99 (23.85) 0.09 (1.94) 1.67 (0.37) 54.95 (32.30) 19.55 (29.94) 
Top 0.01% 41.44 (53.51) 18.94 (15.79) 0.23 (1.12) 0.93 (0.28) 38.47 (29.31) 20.53 (24.17) 
Top 0.1% 58.30 (64.08) 11.35 (10.37) 0.31 0.72) 0.49 (0.21) 29.55 (24.61) 24.25 (28.30) 
Top 1% 61.12 (65.58) 12.54 (11.26) 0.24 (0.53) 0.27 (0.16) 25.83 (22.47) 31.69 (33.53) 
Top 10% 73.40 (75.34) 10.94 (9.74) 0.19 (0.42) 0.19 (0.14) 15.28 (14.37) 36.80 (37.90) 
Top 0.001-
0.0001% 
27.35 (46.49) 21.75 (19.97) 0.10 (1.14) 2.32 (0.45) 48.47 (31.94) 15.78 (32.29) 
Top 0.01-0.001% 50.81 (57.75) 17.14 (12.93) 0.29 (0.83) 0.59 (0.24) 31.17 (28.25) 21.36 (22.42) 
Top 0.1-0.01% 64.56 (67.74) 8.54 (8.50) 0.34 (0.59) 0.32 (0.19) 26.24 (22.99) 26.90 (30.62) 
Top 0.5-0.1% 61.04 (64.88) 12.96 (12.23) 0.23 (0.50) 0.19 (0.14) 25.57 (22.25) 34.63 (34.87) 
Top 1-0.5% 63.39 (67.50) 12.95 (10.79) 0.18 (0.42) 0.20 (0.15) 23.28 (21.14) 38.95 (37.77) 
 
Income Sources, % Y1_NA 
 
 Wages and 
pensions 
Independent 
work 
Interest Rent  Distributed 
profits 
Top 0.0001% 0.53 (0.77) 2.12 (4.65) 0.12 (0.17) 0.00 (0.00) 97.23 (94.41) 
Top 0.001% 2.86 (5.29) 6.65 (8.95) 0.12 (0.22) 0.48 (0.02) 21.59 (85.53) 
Top 0.01% 7.47 (9.76) 7.71 (6.92) 0.11 (0.53) 0.37 (0.08) 84.33 (82.71) 
Top 0.1% 13.62 (13.49) 4.98 (4.73)  0.14 (0.37) 0.21 (0.08) 81.06 (81.33) 
Top 1% 24.97 (23.01) 6.29 (6.19) 0.16 (0.33) 0.15 (0.09) 68.44 (70.38) 
Top 10% 53.96 (52.72) 9.77 (10.10) 0.15 (0.32) 0.14 (0.10) 35.97 (36.75) 
Top 0.001-0.0001% 4.04 (0.77) 8.94 (4.65) 0.12 (0.24) 0.72 (0.02) 86.18 (82.79) 
Top 0.01-0.001% 9.92 (6.68) 8.28 (10.27) 0.11 (0.64) 0.31 (0.11) 81.39 (81.63) 
Top 0.1-0.01% 16.20 (14.91) 3.83 (3.89) 0.15 (0.30) 0.14 (0.08) 79.68 (80.81) 
Top 0.5-0.1% 22.18 (19.84) 4.32 (4.33) 0.17 (0.31) 0.12 (0.07) 73.20 (75.46) 
Top 1-0.5% 39.54 (35.76) 10.25 (10.02) 0.15 (0.32) 0.12 (0.12) 49.93 (53.78) 
 
Income Sources, % Y2_ad 
 
 Wages and 
pensions 
Independent 
work 
Interest Rent  Accrued 
profits 
Distributed 
profits 
(declared) 
Capital gains 
Top 0.0001% 0.05 (0.01) 0.86 (0.16) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 99.08 (99.83) 3.51 (0.64) 4.29 (2.72) 
Top 0.001% 0.55 (0.40) 1.11 (0.53) 0.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.00) 98.30 (99.04) 7.51 (1.98) 1.85 (7.43) 
Top 0.01% 2.29 (2.66) 2.03 (1.60) 0.07 (0.23) 0.10 (0.02) 95.52 (95.49) 9.75 (6.88) 1.70 (5.84) 
Top 0.1% 7.58 (9.33) 2.70 (2.23) 0.12 (0.30) 0.13 (0.06) 89.37 (88.08) 16.70 (14.33) 1.34 (3.34) 
Top 1% 23.25 (25.87) 4.78 (4.61) 0.17 (0.36) 0.14 (0.09) 71.66 (69.07) 21.66 (19.91) 0.62 (1.44) 
Top 10% 53.38 (55.64) 8.08 (7.26) 0.16 (0.35) 0.14 (0.11) 38.24 (36.64) 12.54 (11.89) 0.28 (0.60) 
Top 0.001-0.0001% 0.90 (0.81) 1.28 (0.93) 0.03 (0.08) 0.02 (0.01) 97.78 (98.16) 10.24 (3.42) 0.18 (12.62) 
Top 0.01-0.001% 3.62 (5.05) 2.73 (2.75) 0.11 (0.43) 0.17 (0.04) 93.37 (91.72) 11.47 (12.09) 1.59 (4.15) 
Top 0.1-0.01% 11.69 (15.02) 3.23 (2.77) 0.16 (0.35) 0.15 (0.09) 84.77 (81.77) 22.10 (20.66) 1.06 (1.21) 
Top 0.5-0.1% 25.93 (29.49) 4.01 (4.34) 0.19 (0.39) 0.16 (0.11) 69.71 (65.66) 28.07 (26.22) 0.17 (0.25) 
Top 1-0.5% 44.40 (47.07) 9.20 (8.75) 0.21 (0.42) 0.14 (0.13) 46.06 (43.63) 20.42 (20.00) 0.12 (0.08) 
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Income Sources, % Y2_NA 
 
 Wages and 
pensions 
Independent 
work 
Interest Rent  Accrued 
profits 
Distributed 
profits 
(declared) 
Capital gains 
Top 0.0001% 0.03 (0.01) 0.56 (0.11) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 99.41 (99.88) 1.92 (0.31) 2.34 (1.30) 
Top 0.001% 0.30 (0.19) 0.72 (0.36) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.00) 98.96 (99.43) 4.11 (0.94) 1.01 (3.56) 
Top 0.01% 1.18 (1.17)  1.31 (1.10) 0.02 (0.10) 0.05 (0.01) 97.44 (97.62) 5.42 (3.35) 0.94 (2.84) 
Top 0.1% 4.08 (4.44) 1.81 (1.61) 0.07 (0.15) 0.08 (0.03) 93.97 (93.77) 9.57 (7.31) 0.76 (1.69) 
Top 1% 13.92 (13.94) 3.50 (3.75) 0.10 (0.20) 0.09 (0.05) 82.40 (82.05) 13.60 (11.35) 0.39 (0.81) 
Top 10% 39.83 (38.57) 7.22 (7.37) 0.12 (0.25) 0.11 (0.07) 52.72 (53.73) 9.41 (8.32) 0.21 (0.42) 
Top 0.001-0.0001% 0.49 (0.40) 0.83 (0.64) 0.02 (0.04) 0.01 (0.00) 98.65 (98.92) 5.62 (1.65) 0.10 (6.06) 
Top 0.01-0.001% 1.87 (2.26) 1.77 (1.91) 0.03 (0.18) 0.08 (0.02) 96.25 (95.63) 6.45 (5.99) 0.03 (2.05) 
Top 0.1-0.01% 6.45 (7.43) 2.22 (2.07) 0.10 (0.19) 0.10 (0.04) 91.13 (90.26) 12.96 (10.93) 0.61 (0.63) 
Top 0.5-0.1% 15.51 (16.17) 2.91 (3.56) 0.12 (0.23) 0.10 (0.06) 81.36 (79.98) 17.88 (15.30) 0.11 (0.13) 
Top 1-0.5% 30.89 (29.97) 7.79 (8.47) 0.15 (0.27) 0.10 (0.8) 61.07 (61.21) 14.71 (13.39) 0.09 (0.07) 
 
 
 
Appendix 4 Top incomes: shares within shares, 2005 (2009) 
 
Y1 incomes (distributed profits) 
 
 Y1 
shares within 
Y1_NA 
shares within 
Y1_NA_ada 
shares within 
Y1_NA_ada’ 
shares within 
Top 1%  Top 10%   Top 1%   Top 10% Top 1% Top 10%   Top 1%   Top 10% 
0.0001% 0.58 (0.33) 0.18 (0.10) 0.97 (0.49) 0.38 (0.19) 2.89 (5.00) 1.17 (2.05) 4.56 (7.40) 1.85 (3.15) 
0.001% 2.15 (1.72) 0.67 (0.52) 2.89 (2.08) 1.13 (0.80) 7.17 (9.53) 2.90 (3.90) 10.3 (13.9) 4.32 (5.90) 
0.01% 6.99 6.54) 2.20 (1.99) 8.35 (7.55) 3.27 (2.92) 16.6 (18.5) 6.73 (7.58) 22.9 (25.1) 9.58 (10.7) 
0.1% 25.8 (25.4) 8.12 (7.75) 28.2 (27.3) 11.1 (10.6) 38.6 (40.0) 15.6 (16.4) 46.4 (47.8) 19.4 (20.4) 
1% 100 31.4 (30.5)   100 39.2 (38.6) 100 40.5 (41.0) 100 41.8 (42.6) 
 
 
Y2 incomes (accrued profits) 
 
  Y2 
shares within 
Y2_ad 
shares within 
Y2_aa  
shares within 
Y2_NA 
shares within 
 Top 1% Top 10%  Top 1%    Top 10%   Top 1% Top 10%  Top 1%   Top 10% 
0.0001% 3.91 (6.35) 1.44 (2.33) 3.06 (4.95) 1.28 (2.02) 4.59 (7.54) 1.99 (3.24) 4.56 (5.82) 1.75 (2.95) 
0.001% 9.16 (11.9) 3.37 (4.37) 7.54 (9.43) 3.15 (3.85) 
10.76 (14.1) 4.67 (6.06) 
8.53 (11.1) 4.30 (5.61) 
0.01% 20.5 (21.8)  7.52 (8.00) 17.3 (18.3) 7.24 (7.49) 
23.7 (25.5) 10.3 (10.9) 
19.4 (21.1) 9.79 (10.7) 
0.1% 42.6 (43.1) 15.6 (15.8) 39.6 (39.9) 16.6 (16.3) 
47.6 (48.3) 20.7 (20.7) 
43.2 (44.3) 21.8 (22.5) 
1% 100 36.8 (36.7) 100 41.8 (40.9)  100 43.4 (43.0)   100 50.5 (50.8) 
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Appendix 5: Average incomes and income thresholds 
 
Y1 
 
 Chilean pesos USD 
  Average income Threshold Average income Threshold 
 2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2009 
Top 0.0001% 2,756,727,378 2,149,063,140 1,795,894,443 1,596,413,500 4,942,879 3,911,135 3,220,082 2,905,354 
Top 0.001-0.0001% 820,095,454 904,518,379 501,481,445 633,083,121 1,470,451 1,646,156 899,168 1,152,164 
Top 0.01-0.001% 260,106,932 335,430,229 187,978,489 239,448,182 466,378 610,458 337,050 435,778 
Top 0.1-0.015 101,271,514 130,013,620 72,039,594 91,193,768 181,582 236,615 129,169 165,966 
Top 0.5-0.1% 39,811,977 62,480,165 38,167,187 49,402,507 71,384 113,709 68,435 89,909 
Top 1-0.5% 32,565,451 42,534,681 28,197,132 37,167,633 58,391 77,410 50,558 67,642 
Top 0.0001% 2,756,727,378 2,149,063,140   4,942,879 3,911,135   
Top 0.001% 1,013,758,647 1,017,658,812   1,817,694 1,852,063   
Top 0.01% 337,010,168 406,901,795   604,267 740,531   
Top 0.1% 124,917,766 157,623,552   223,981 286,863   
Top 1% 48,329,283 62,021,762   86,656 112,875   
Top 10%  15,382,291 20,335,763   27,581 37,010   
 
Y1_NA 
 
 Chilean pesos USD 
  Average income Threshold Average income Threshold 
 2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2009 
Top 0.0001% 25,271,948,816 5,598,497,017 1,044,897,589 3,127,500,696 45,313,212 10,188,848 1,873,527 5,691,819 
Top 0.001-0.0001% 421,225,402 1,813,177,012 140,202,776 1,259,596,029 755,267 3,299,847 251,387 2,292,371 
Top 0.01-0.001% 105,511,733 661,495,116 46,771,201 448,180,843 189,185 1,203,872 83,862 815,656 
Top 0.1-0.015 46,324,469 237,097,389 43,312,277 169,142,968 83,061 431,500 77,660 307,828 
Top 0.5-0.1% 17,143,645 113,247,161 6,833,980 83,362,896 30,739 206,101 12,253 151,714 
Top 1-0.5% 8,597,578 66,586,692 5,899,319 54,432,378 15,416 121,183 10,578 99,063 
Top 0.0001% 25,271,948,816 5,598,497,017   45,313,212 10,188,848   
Top 0.001% 6,229,073,946 2,157,297,013   11,168,879 3,926,120   
Top 0.01% 1,461,990,318 818,198,172   2,621,384 1,489,060   
Top 0.1% 335,199,920 295,041,912   601,022 536,954   
Top 1% 84,558,115 108,096,402   151,615 196,727   
Top 10%  20,235,263 27,976,632   36,282 50,915   
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Y2_ad 
 
 Chilean pesos USD 
  Average income Threshold Average income Threshold 
 2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2009 
Top 0.0001% 25,271,948,816 56,412,287,963 1,044,897,589 11,742,069,805 45,313,212 102,666,169 1,873,527 21,369,694 
Top 0.001-0.0001% 421,225,402 5,110,525,776 140,202,776 2,664,920,597 755,267 9,300,777 251,387 4,849,957 
Top 0.01-0.001% 105,511,733 1,079,916,820 46,771,201 613,841,077 189,185 1,965,368 83,862 1,117,145 
Top 0.1-0.015 46,324,469 259,132,258 43,312,277 158,439,889 83,061 471,601 77,660 288,349 
Top 0.5-0.1% 17,143,645 94,695,374 6,833,980 66,823,693 30,739 172,339 12,253 121,614 
Top 1-0.5% 8,597,578 54,363,468 5,899,319 45,668,838 15,416 98,937 10,578 83,114 
Top 0.0001% 25,271,948,816 56,412,287,963   45,313,212 102,666,169   
Top 0.001% 6,229,073,946 9,774,322,339   11,168,879 17,788,540   
Top 0.01% 1,461,990,318 1,990,759,303   2,621,384 3,623,034   
Top 0.1% 335,199,920 431,801,622   601,022 785,847   
Top 1% 84,558,115 108,240,046   151,615 196,989   
Top 10%  20,235,263 26,491,179   36,282 48,212   
 
 
 
 
Y2_NA 
 
 Chilean pesos USD 
  Average income Threshold Average income Threshold 
 2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2009 2005 2009 
Top 0.0001% 46,297,995,325 118,211,956,433 18,149,560,075 24,412,133,934 83,013,420 215,136,970 32,542,598 44,428,268 
Top 0.001-0.0001% 7,493,760,347 10,633,300,947 4,105,956,111 5,572,295,754 13,436,493 19,351,817 7,362,078 10,141,164 
Top 0.01-0.001% 1,646,544,104 2,182,726,743 919,981,993 1,228,015,105 2,952,293 3,972,400 1,649,550 2,234,896 
Top 0.1-0.015 360,375,536 495,801,807 211,512,455 291,348,556 646,162 902,322 379,247 530,233 
Top 0.5-0.1% 97,504,301 165,367,443 78,346,112 108,837,656 174,828 300,956 140,476 198,076 
Top 1-0.5% 59,220,807 82,889,647 46,175,105 64,547,051 106,184 150,853 82,793 117,471 
Top 0.0001% 46,297,995,325 118,211,956,433   83,013,420 215,136,970   
Top 0.001% 11,374,183,844 20,413,178,718   20,394,185 37,150,467   
Top 0.01% 2,639,160,404 4,092,583,617   4,732,078 7,448,198   
Top 0.1% 588,953,752 854,455,264   1,056,008 1,555,045   
Top 1% 136,388,041 193,037,327   244,547 351,314   
Top 10%  27,040,882 38,014,716   48,485 69,184   
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Appendix 6: Effective tax rates, top 1%, 2005 (excluding corporate tax on retained profits) 
(Horizontal axis: income ranking within cumulative top percentile of adults) 
 
Y1 
 
 
 
 
Y1_NA*      Y1_NA_ada* 
 
          
*Outliers above 40% excluded 
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